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ABSTRACT 
 
Much of the contemporary management literature on modularity implicitly 
assumes that increased product modularity is associated with advantageous increases in 
organizational modularity. Known as the “mirroring hypothesis,” this postulated 
relationship is the basis of prescriptions in favor of increasingly modular product design, 
despite inconclusive empirical evidence. The three essays in this dissertation seek to 
advance the extant literature on the mirroring hypothesis in the following ways: Essay 
one presents a systematic review of this fragmented literature. Specifically, this review 
finds that the extant literature currently contains inconsistent interpretations of 
modularity, as well as inconsistent conceptualizations of mirroring. Thus, debates on the 
mirroring hypothesis often amount to unproductive arguments over different things. 
Essay two puts forth a theoretical framework to explore mirroring between product and 
organization at the within-firm level. The proposed theory maintains that mirroring is 
contingent on the level of architectural knowledge, which correlates with a set of 
observable constructs. Essay three empirically tests the proposition that mirroring 
between product and organization is also contingent on the demand characteristics of the 
target customers. Using a sample constructed from the computer systems integration 
industry, I found empirical support for the proposed demand-side contingencies on 
mirroring.  
Research on the mirroring hypothesis has made important contributions to our 
understanding of the interactions between technology and organization. However, the 
extant narratives of mirroring in fact encompass distinct causal mechanisms interacting 
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across multiple units of analysis. As this dissertation research shows, the structural 
correspondence between product and organization is like mirrors in a funhouse – there 
are many mirrors; and many of the mirrors are distorted. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The interaction between technology and organization has been a well-established 
research area in management scholarship (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965). 
More recently, management scholars elaborate on this interaction and advance the idea of 
modularity as a solution to growing complexity in technology and organization (Baldwin 
and Clark, 1997, 2000; Sanchez, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Specifically, these 
scholars put forth the so-called “mirroring hypothesis” between product and organization, 
which postulates that increased product modularity is associated with advantageous 
increases in organizational modularity (Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Hoetker, 2006; 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Despite inconclusive empirical evidence (Brusoni, 
Prencipe, and Pavitt, 2001; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Ernst, 2005), much of the 
subsequent management research on modularity seems to have implicitly accepted the 
mirroring hypothesis (Hoetker, 2006). 
 This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of mirroring between 
product and organization. In particular, the three studies answer the recent call for a more 
contingent model that goes beyond asking whether the mirroring hypothesis holds or not, 
but instead explains and predicts when the mirroring relationship will hold and when it 
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will not (Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 2013). The following section summarizes the three essays. 
1. Systematic Review. Chapter 2 reports the findings of a systematic review of the 
relevant literatures on the mirroring hypothesis, using methods developed in the 
evidence-based management literature (Denyer and Neely, 2004; Tranfield, Denyer, and 
Smart, 2003), which require systematic, transparent, and reproducible criteria to select 
and synthesize relevant studies. Given that our understanding of mirroring is still 
incomplete and that extant research has found both great benefits (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) and risks (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990) of mirroring, there is a pressing need for a more nuanced 
synthesis of past research to map out the conceptual landscape of a heterogeneous body 
of research drawn from multiple literatures.  
Specifically, the objectives of the systematic review are to: (1) identify the ways 
in which definitions of modularity differ, and what these differences mean in terms of 
mirroring; and (2) contextualize observations of different types of mirroring so that they 
can be systematically compared and contrasted with one another.  
This review identifies four clusters of definitions of modularity in the extant 
literature on the mirroring. Despite a general consensus on the foundational properties 
(loose coupling and near decomposability), substantial variations and ambiguity remain 
in the ways in which modularity is defined and interpreted. In particular, analysis of the 
findings reveals that many attributes commonly associated with modularity (e.g., 
reusability, substitutability, component commonality, etc.) in the extant literature actually 
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describe additional dimensions of characteristics beyond the foundational properties of 
modularity. Thus, one key insight of this review is that not all interpretations of 
modularity characterize the structural patterns associated with the observations of 
mirroring between product and organization.  
This study also finds that despite a general level of support for the mirroring 
hypothesis in the extant literature, there is less support for mirroring at higher levels of 
analysis. Moreover, distinct causal mechanisms (coordination, incentive, and competitive) 
have been invoked to explain mirroring, suggesting that modularity conveys different 
meanings or conditions at different levels. Failure to make these distinctions might have 
contributed to the inconsistent empirical findings. In addition, this review finds 
significant differences in the support for the mirroring hypothesis across industries. 
Comparative analysis across industries suggests that mirroring between product and 
organization depends not only on how modular the product is, but also on how the 
product is modularized in the specific technological regimes, i.e., the specific way in 
which the product is partitioned into stand-alone components. 
2. Contingent Model. Chapter 3 puts forth a theoretical framework to explore 
mirroring between product and organization at the within-firm level, which is the level of 
analysis in the original formulations of the mirroring hypothesis. The proposed theory is 
based on the premise that implicit assumptions underpinning the prediction of mirroring 
have been taken for granted and are in fact not always tenable. Specifically, I maintain 
that the extant literature on the mirroring hypothesis has come to implicitly posit that 
organizations adopting modular product development possess architectural knowledge of 
all possible component interactions, such that the overall system architecture can be 
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completely specified a priori. That is, these organizations are assumed to be capable of 
specifying component interfaces that completely partition product systems into stand-
alone modules that only interact through the standardized interfaces.  
I submit that these implicit assumptions of completeness should be better 
understood as theoretical ideals; the extent to which these assumptions are borne out in 
practice places the boundary conditions on the prediction of mirroring. That is, consistent 
with Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles (2004), I maintain that no product development 
organization is omniscient with regard to component interactions and their implications 
to system behaviors. Even with the best efforts at ex-ante standardization, some 
component interactions can only be identified during the design process, or even after the 
product system has been put to use. Architectural knowledge is inevitably incomplete; 
mirroring is therefore contingent on the level of architectural knowledge. Accordingly, a 
set of propositions is systematically derived from this baseline contingency to complete 
the proposed theory framework.   
3. Empirical Study. The fourth chapter is an empirical study of the mirroring 
hypothesis in the computer systems integration industry, which is well-known for its 
modular product architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Langlois and Robertson, 1992; 
Sturgeon, 2002). The dominant computer architecture is the Intel x86 standard1, with 
public standards defining all major component interfaces and a well-established 
                                                
1 Apple’s Macintosh was the remaining major personal computer product line not using the Intel 
x86 architecture (based on the competing PowerPC architecture) until 2006. Intel x86 architecture 
has since become the only PC architecture by major PC manufacturers until Samsung’s 
introduction of its Google Chromebook in 2012, which is based on the ARM architecture 
primarily used in mobile devices. Despite these important competing architectures and their 
strategic implications, Intel x86 has been the dominant standard throughout the history of 
personal computing.   
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commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) market supplying a large selection of interchangeable 
parts. In addition, systems integration capability has become so mature and diffused that 
anyone with some basic skills can easily obtain the needed parts and put together a 
functioning computer system, which is evidenced by the robust do-it-yourself community. 
Simply put, not only are all PC components commoditized, systems integration is also 
characterized by low entry barrier2.        
Based on these industry characteristics, mainstream interpretations of the 
mirroring hypothesis would predict that systems building firms rely on the COTS market 
to take advantage of the mature modular architecture. However, many systems building 
firms deviate from this prediction and continue to adopt more integrated approaches to 
build computer systems that are fully Intel x86 compatible. The rationales behind this 
deviation thus shed light on the important contingencies on the mirroring hypothesis. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that mirroring between product and organization is contingent 
on demand characteristics. Specifically, I predict that the extent of mirroring is reduced 
for companies targeting performance-intensive market tiers, or companies targeting 
customers who would suffer great economic loss in the event of system failures.  
   
  
                                                
2 My focus here is on the systems building stage only. Systems integration in this stage does not 
include the design and fabrication of integrated circuits or other upstream activities, which can be 
highly technical and have high entry barriers.   
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  CHAPTER 2 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE EXTANT 
LITERATURE ON THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Research from a wide range of disciplines posits that a correspondence exists 
between product and organizational architectures (Argyres and Bigelow, 2010; Baldwin 
and Clark, 2000; Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Conway, 
1968; Herbsleb and Grinter, 1999; Hoetker, 2006; MacCormack, Baldwin, and Rusnak, 
2012; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; among others). In particular, much of the 
contemporary management literature on modularity adopts the assumption that increased 
product modularity is associated with advantageous increases in organizational 
modularity (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Jacobides, 2005; 
Langlois, 2002; MacCormack et al., 2012; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Sanchez, 1995, 
1999; Sturgeon, 2002).  
 First articulated in the management literature by Henderson and Clark (1990), 
Sanchez (1995), and Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), and later named the "mirroring 
hypothesis" by Colfer (2007), this proposed relationship postulates that the structure of a 
product development organization and the architecture of the product being developed 
would come to "mirror" each other. However, subsequent empirical research has not 
consistently found support for this proposed relationship. Specifically, Colfer and 
Baldwin’s (2010) review of 102 empirical studies on the mirroring hypothesis finds that 
69% of the studies either provide support or at least find partial or mixed support. 
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However, their review also shows that the extant literature has yet to converge on a 
consistent or systematic explanation for the remaining 31% of the studies that find no 
support or produce contradictory evidence.  
 Moreover, there remain critical inconsistencies in this literature. Inconsistencies 
impede cumulative knowledge development and prolong the ongoing debate. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this essay is to conduct a comprehensive review of the extant 
literature, so that fundamental inconsistencies can be systematically revealed. More 
importantly, this essay aims to examine what these inconsistencies mean in terms of our 
current understanding of mirroring between product and organization.  
This essay proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews these critical 
inconsistencies and discusses how the extant narratives of mirroring in fact encompass 
distinct phenomena. As a result, debates on the empirical status of the mirroring 
hypothesis often amount to arguments over different things. The next section presents the 
review method, which attempts to rectify the deficiencies of the review methods 
traditionally adopted in management research. This is followed by a detailed discussion 
of the review findings and the conclusion. 
2.1.1 Critique of the Extant Literature on the Mirroring Hypothesis 
 The concept of modularity is central to the research on the mirroring hypothesis. 
As a general systems concept (Bertalanffy, 1968; Schilling, 2000), modularity has 
received significant research interests across a wide range of disciplines that deal with 
complex systems (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Fixson, 2007b; Schilling, 2002). With its 
diverse theoretical and practical applications, modularity has a broad-based, intuitive 
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appeal to both researchers and practitioners. However, this widely held intuition belies 
the underlying complex, multidimensional meanings that have eluded a consistent 
definition.  
 Inconsistent meanings of modularity. Scholars have noted that even within the 
management literature, substantial variations and ambiguities exist in the ways in which 
the concept of modularity is defined and interpreted (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; 
Fixson, 2002, 2003, 2007a). Despite an implicit consensus on a general idea, modularity 
as it is being used really encompasses a bundle of characteristics rather than a single 
condition (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Fixson, 2007b; Gershenson, Prasad, and 
Zhang, 2003, 2004; Sako, 2004). In addition, different viewpoints tend to emphasize 
different elements (Fixson, 2002, 2003, 2007a), which is reflected in the different 
definitions and operationalizations. For instance, widely cited definitions for modularity 
include “the degree to which a system’s components can be separated and recombined” 
(Schilling, 2000: 312), “high degree of independence or ‘loose coupling’ between 
component designs by standardizing component interface specifications” (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996: 65), “interdependence within and independence across modules” 
through “abstraction, information hiding, and interface” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000: 63), 
and an architectural type characterized by “a one-to-one mapping from functional 
elements in the function structure to the physical components of the product” (Ulrich, 
1995: 422). Whereas some of these definitions describe the properties and conditions that 
constitute the concept of modularity, others give more emphasis on the antecedents or 
design processes that create the desirable properties associated with modularity. 
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However, it remains unclear whether these definitions are logically equivalent, essentially 
restatements of the same underpinning ideas, or they reflect real conceptual differences.  
 Furthermore, the extant literature has yet to clearly delineate modularity with 
related concepts like commonality (Fixson, 2007b), reusability (Biggerstaff and Richter, 
1987; Jones, 1984; Prieto-Diaz, 1993), and substitutability (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 
1995). These concepts are often used interchangeably with modularity, even though they 
actually convey distinct ideas or emphases. Thus, modularity as a theoretical construct 
still suffers from insufficient construct clarity. More importantly, as a core construct for 
much of the research literature on the mirroring hypothesis3, insufficient construct clarity 
impedes rigorous empirical testing and the development of cumulative knowledge 
(Suddaby, 2010).  
 Inconsistent conceptualizations of mirroring. Even though the mirroring 
hypothesis appears to be a relatively straightforward statement of structural 
correspondence, closer reading of the relevant literatures suggests that the proposed 
relationship is conceptualized differently across research streams. In particular, mirroring 
has been proposed at different levels of analysis. 
                                                
3 Note that not all of the conceptualizations of the mirroring hypothesis make explicit use of 
modularity. For instance, following Conway’s (1968) conceptualization, Colfer and Baldwin 
(2010) formally define the mirroring hypothesis in terms of the structural correspondence 
between two networks - one technical and one organizational, and suggest an ideal test of the 
hypothesis that examines the correlation between these two networks. The direct examination of 
the structural correlation thus does not require researchers to assess either product or 
organizational modularity. This procedure is a stronger test on mirroring since two networks with 
little structural correspondence can still exhibit similar degree of modularity, resulting in false 
support for the hypothesis. However, because of the difficulty to directly measure technical and 
organizational networks except in the context of software development, much of the literature on 
the mirroring hypothesis relies on the concept of modularity as a system attribute to indirectly 
assess the extent of mirroring. Inconsistent definitions and operationalizations of modularity 
would thus further weaken an indirect test.  
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One stream of studies conceptualizes the mirroring hypothesis as a within-firm 
structural correspondence between product and organization (e.g., Cataldo et al., 2006, 
2009; Conway, 1968; Herbsleb and Grinter, 1999; MacCormack et al., 2012; Sosa, 
Eppinger, and Rowles, 2004). The proposed correspondence is thus an isomorphic 
relationship between the focal firm’s organizational structure and the technical 
architectures of the products being developed (Colfer and Baldwin, 2010). Another 
stream of studies conceptualizes the mirroring hypothesis as the correspondence between 
product architecture and the way inter-firm relationships are organized (e.g., Argyres and 
Bigelow, 2010; Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Furlan, Cabigiosu, and Camuffo, 2014; 
Hoetker, Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 2007; Hoetker, 2006; Mikkola, 2003; Monteverde, 
1995). That is, the mirroring hypothesis at the inter-firm level is between the governance 
of product development tasks across firm boundaries and the product system’s 
underlying pattern of technical dependencies. A third stream of studies extends the 
analysis of inter-firm organization to the industry-level. These studies (e.g., Fixson and 
Park, 2008; Galvin and Morkel, 2001; Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Lee and Berente, 
2012; Linden and Somaya, 2003; Sahaym, Steensma, and Schilling, 2007; Shibata, Yano, 
and Kodama, 2005) focus on how the overall industry structure co-evolves with the 
trajectory of product architectures and the underpinning technologies. In this context, the 
mirroring hypothesis is conceptualized as the correspondence between product 
architecture and industry organization.   
Importantly, while similar narratives of mirroring have been applied to the 
proposed relationships at different levels, the constructs being mirrored are in fact 
different across these research streams, which have been developed more or less 
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independently until recently. Furthermore, these research streams invoke different causal 
mechanisms to explain mirroring.  
Specifically, the within-firm studies typically draw on contingency theory (Burns 
and Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985: 198; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965) and the information-processing view 
of organization (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Galbraith, 1974; Tushman and Nadler, 
1978) to explain mirroring. These researchers maintain that product modularity 
economizes on organizational information processing, which is the causal mechanism 
that brings about mirroring (Conway, 1968; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). The inter-firm 
studies place the analytical focus on product modularity’s implications on a firm's 
boundary choice and the corresponding governance mode. These researchers maintain 
that product modularity reduces the risk of opportunism by making it easier to switch 
component suppliers (e.g., Hoetker, 2006) and retain proprietary information (e.g., 
Argyres and Bigelow, 2010) through information hiding (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; 
Parnas, 1972). Minimizing transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985) is thus an 
important mirroring mechanism at the inter-firm level. In the industry-level studies, 
researchers have begun to recognize the existence of multiple linkages between product 
architecture and industry structure (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003; Fixson and Park, 2008; 
Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995). Technological change and industry organization are 
connected through the interactions among multiple competitive and institutional 
mechanisms. This discussion suggests that distinct causal forces have been conflated 
under the banner of mirroring. There are in fact multiple distinct albeit interrelated 
mirroring mechanisms. Moreover, how these mechanisms interact remains largely 
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unexplored. The extant literature on mirroring hypothesis is thus more fragmented than it 
appears.  
Leading scholars have called for a more contingent model of mirroring that goes 
beyond asking whether the mirroring hypothesis holds or not, but instead explains and 
predicts when the mirroring relationship will hold and when it will not (Cabigiosu and 
Camuffo, 2012; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Sanchez and Mahoney, 2013). However, as 
an emerging literature that combines ideas from distant disciplines, the extant literature 
on the mirroring hypothesis still contains numerous critical inconsistencies. These 
inconsistencies deserve more research attention before useful refinement can be attained. 
2.1.2 Review Method 
 One possible reason that these inconsistencies persist is the way literature reviews 
have been conducted. Traditionally, management literature reviews are ad hoc and 
narrative-based, which can be lacking in thoroughness and rigor (Tranfield et al., 2003). 
Particularly, narrative reviews often select articles for inclusion on the implicit biases of 
the researchers (Fink, 2010; Hart, 1998; Tranfield et al., 2003). Rousseau et al. (2008) 
maintain that traditional management reviews are often position papers, cherry-picking 
studies to advocate a point of view. As a result, inconsistencies are often left unresolved 
and the literature remains fragmented. Some review methodologists even suggest that 
traditional review approach is often biased by factors that would be unforgivable in 
primary research (Evans and Pearson, 2001; Glass, McGaw, and Smith, 1981) and is 
therefore not undertaken as a genuine investigatory science (Tranfield et al., 2003).  
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 Advocates of the evidence-based management movement note that their 
counterparts in medical sciences have steadily improved the quality of review process in 
the past decades through the development of systematic review methods (Denyer and 
Neely, 2004; Tranfield et al., 2003; Whittemore and Knafl, 2005). These methods 
attempt to address the 'deficiencies of traditional review methods by applying the same 
standards to secondary research (where the unit of analysis is other research studies) as 
should be applied to primary research' (Davies and Crombie, 1998: 2). The aim is to 
achieve reliable research synthesis, which is the "systematic accumulation, analysis and 
reflective interpretation of the full body of relevant empirical evidence related to a 
question" (Rousseau et al., 2008: 475).  
 Even though fundamental differences in the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions between medical sciences and management prevent the direct transplant of 
all systematic review methods (e.g., methods designed to synthesize findings from 
randomized controlled experiments might not apply easily to most management 
research4), Tranfield et al. (2003) propose that specific principles can still be usefully 
applied to management research to counteract bias by making explicit the values and 
assumptions underpinning a review. Specifically, they state that systematic review in 
management should adhere to the following guidelines: (1) include explicit development 
of clear and precise review objectives, (2) follow review protocol clearly defined at the 
outset, (3) conduct comprehensive search for all potentially relevant articles, (4) use 
                                                
4 Meta-analysis is considered a particular type of systematic review method that combines data 
from multiple primary studies by employing statistical methods (Glass, 1976). However, this 
method requires the research design and hypotheses of primary studies to be very similar, if not 
identical (Cooper, 1998), which is not always the case for management research. This method is 
not applicable when studies to be reviewed include both quantitative and qualitative studies. It is 
therefore not a suitable review method for the literature on the mirroring hypothesis.  
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explicit and reproducible criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of articles, and (5) apply 
an explicit analytic framework to synthesize individual studies. These guidelines help 
ensure the review process is carried out in a systematic, transparent, and reproducible 
manner.  
 Following the review guidelines suggested by Tranfield et al. (2003), Denyer and 
Neely (2004), and Whittemore and Knafl (2005), and the examples provided by a number 
of exemplary systematic reviews in the management literature (e.g., Keupp, Palmié, and 
Gassmann, 2012; Nijmeijer, Fabbricotti, and Huijsman, 2013; Pittaway et al., 2004; 
Ravasi and Stigliani, 2012), I formulate a multi-stage review protocol for this essay. The 
following subsections describe the review protocol in detail.  
 Review objectives. One central thesis of an emerging revisionist perspective is 
that the mainstream modularity literature has the tendency to put forth generalized 
prescriptions of mirroring between product and organization based on empirical 
observations that are more or less context-specific (Ernst, 2005). Given that there remain 
substantial inconsistencies in how mirroring is conceptualized and that there are in fact 
multiple mirroring mechanisms, simple prescriptions in favor of a generalized notion of 
mirroring are unlikely to be specific enough to inform practice. Moreover, the danger of 
strong mirroring is also illustrated by Henderson and Clark's (1990) well known 
observation that incumbents often suffer sharp decline in the face of architectural 
innovations because their architectural knowledge tends to become embedded in 
organizational structure, i.e., some instances of mirroring can lead to 'modularity trap' 
(Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001) and have disastrous consequences. Furthermore, the 
substantial variations and ambiguities in the ways in which modularity is interpreted 
15 
 
suggest that we might not yet fully know what mirroring means exactly. Given that our 
understanding of mirroring is still incomplete and that extant research has found both 
great benefits and danger of mirroring, there is a pressing need for a more nuanced 
synthesis of past research to map out the conceptual landscape of a heterogeneous body 
of research. Specifically, the objectives of the review are to:  
1. Identify the ways in which definitions of modularity differ, and what these 
differences mean in terms of mirroring; and 
 
2. Contextualize observations of different types of mirroring so that they can be 
systematically compared and contrasted with one another. 
 Search strategy. One key principle of systematic review is the construction of an 
unbiased evidence base, which requires using comprehensive and protocol-driven search 
strategy to identify potentially relevant studies. Ideally, all articles relevant to the review 
objectives should be included; however, identifying all relevant studies can be 
challenging. The fact that the mirroring hypothesis literature combines independently 
developed research streams from distant disciplines further complicates this search 
challenge. In order to use an electronic citation indexing service, this review is limited to 
journal articles, omitting books, book chapters, and working papers. The search strategy 
follows a multi-stage process: 
1. Starting from Colfer and Baldwin's (2010)5 selection of 19 journals, and 
informed by the prior knowledge that the extant literature draws on research from 
three disciplines (i.e., management, software engineering, and product 
                                                
5 To the best of my knowledge, Colfer and Baldwin (2010) is the only review article that 
considers all three relevant literature streams. The expanded list of 32 journals is also reviewed by 
two senior management scholars.  
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development), I select 32 high-impact journals to represent these three literatures. 
These journals are listed in Table 2.1. 
2. To increase comprehensiveness and ensure unbiased search, the keyword search 
string was developed iteratively in the following manner:  
First, I identify all the relevant articles referenced6 by Colfer and Baldwin's 
(2010) with more than 100 citations as reported by Google Scholar. This step 
produces 16 seminal articles representative of the literature as the search "target." 
Second, using Thomson Reuters' Web of Science indexing service, I iteratively 
expand Colfer and Baldwin's (2010) search keywords until all 16 seminal articles 
are among the articles in the search result. The iterative expansion of the search 
string is also informed by prior knowledge of the literature. For instance, in the 
software engineering literature, the mirroring hypothesis is known as "Conway's 
Law" (Conway, 1968) or "socio-technical congruence" (Cataldo, Herbsleb, and 
Carley, 2008). These terms are added to the search string to increase 
comprehensiveness.  
I also compare the search results produced by each incremental search string 
expansion to make sure the additional search terms actually identify more relevant 
articles. This extra step ensures that all the search terms are theoretically 
meaningful. Overall, 797 potentially relevant articles are identified using the 
expanded keyword search string. The fact that all 16 seminal articles are 
identified by a theoretically meaningful keyword search string gives high 
confidence of the comprehensiveness of this search procedure. The final keyword 
search string is presented in Table 2.2.  
3. I read the abstracts of the 797 articles and retain only those articles meeting the 
inclusion criteria discussed below. This step produces 113 potentially relevant 
articles. I then read the 113 articles in detail. 9 articles are removed at this step for 
                                                
6 Colfer and Baldwin's (2010) review only considers empirical studies. Since this current review 
intends to cover both empirical and non-empirical studies, I reviewed and identified all the 
relevant non-empirical articles referenced by Colfer and Baldwin (2010) and added them to the 
citation count list as well. Articles referenced that do not pertain to the mirroring hypothesis were 
excluded. The aim is to construct of list of seminal articles to represent the literature.  
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failing to meet the inclusion criteria. This search procedure thus identifies 104 
relevant articles to review. The full list of the articles is reported in the Appendix. 
I should also note that of the 113 articles, 63 are articles I was unaware of before 
this review effort. The identification of a large number of unfamiliar articles gives 
confidence that the search procedure is indeed unbiased. 
 
 Inclusion criteria. This essay reviews both empirical and conceptual articles 
since the review objectives include identifying definitional differences in the literature. 
Specifically, to be included in this review, the article should (1) investigate both product 
architecture and organization structure at within-firm, inter-firm, or industry-level; (2) 
report empirical analysis or present conceptual elaboration that either directly addresses 
the mechanism(s) linking product and organization or addresses consequences of the 
linkage(s) between product and organization from which mirroring can be indirectly 
inferred. These conditions are intentionally inclusive to serve the review objective of 
mapping out the conceptual landscape of a fragmented literature. For the same reason, 
this review does not perform stringent quality evaluation to exclude studies the way 
meta-analytic studies typically do.  
Analytic framework. The review objectives stated at the outset of a systematic 
review directly informs the construction of the analytic framework. The analytic 
framework is an integral element of a review protocol since it describes and structures the 
coding procedure and the analysis of the included articles. In order to achieve the review 
objectives stated above, the included articles in this essay are coded and analyzed along 
the following four dimensions:  
1. Context of Mirroring:  
18 
 
● At what level(s) of organization is the mirroring relationship examined or 
theorized? 
● What is the industry context of the study? 
● What is the level of dynamism of the prevailing product architecture - 
stable, evolving, or changing radically? 
2. Conceptualization of Modularity: 
● What is the conceptual definition for modularity cited in the article?  
● How is product modularity operationalized?  
● How is organizational modularity operationalized? 
● What life-cycle dimension is product modularity observed in (i.e., 
modularity in design, manufacturing, or in use)?  
3. Mechanism(s) of Mirroring: 
● What is the theoretical explanation given in support of (or against) the 
mirroring hypothesis? 
● What is the direction of causality?  
4. Findings:  
● (For empirical studies) What type of evidence is provided in support of (or 
against) the mirroring hypothesis? 
● What are the findings of the study (i.e., direct support, indirect support, 
contingent support, or contradict the mirroring hypothesis7)? 
Note that some of the coding categories do not apply to all included articles. For 
instance, studies from the software engineering literature typically do not measure 
product and organizational modularity to study mirroring; instead, structural correlation 
between software product and organization structure is directly measured. It is also 
                                                
7 An article is coded as providing direct support if the empirical evidence directly demonstrates 
mirroring between product and organization or if the conceptual discussion concludes in direct 
support for the hypothesis. An article is coded as providing indirect support if the empirical 
evidence or the theoretical claims can be used to indirectly infer support for the mirroring 
hypothesis, e.g., observing performance advantage for mirroring even though the sample contains 
a roughly equal mix of observations of mirroring and lack of mirroring. An article is coded as 
providing contingent support if the findings clearly identify condition(s) under which mirroring is 
supported.  
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important to note that the coding procedure is not intended to produce statistical synthesis 
of past research.  
 
2.2 The Evidence Base 
 Applying the analytic framework to the 104 included articles produces the 
evidence base for this systematic review. The following section presents an overview of 
the results. Detailed analysis and discussion follow.  
2.2.1 Overview of Results 
 Among the 104 included studies, 43 studies examine within-firm mirroring, 39 
studies examine inter-firm mirroring, and 32 studies examine industry-level mirroring8. 
In total, 34 within-firm studies (79.07%), 31 inter-firm studies (79.49%), and 23 industry-
level studies (71.88%) conclude with direct, indirect, or contingent support for the 
mirroring hypothesis. This finding is consistent with the current consensus that there is a 
general level of support for the mirroring hypothesis in the extant literature. This finding 
also shows that there is less support in the current literature for mirroring at the industry-
level. In addition, counting only those studies that clearly identify contingencies under 
which the mirroring hypothesis is supported results in 7 within-firm studies (16.28%), 8 
inter-firm studies (20.1%), and 8 industry-level studies (25.00%). 3 within-firm studies 
(6.98%), 7 inter-firm studies (17.95%), and 7 industry-level studies (21.88%) produce 
findings that contradict the mirroring hypothesis. Thus, there is more evidence that 
                                                
8 These counts add up to 114, which is greater than the number of included articles. This is 
because some articles examine mirroring at more than one level.  
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mirroring at higher level involves more factors that impinge on the mirroring process. 
These findings are summarized in Figure 2.1. 
Importantly, these numbers should not be interpreted as results of aggregated 
statistical tests on the mirroring hypothesis. No attempt is made to combine statistical 
observations across individual studies. These numbers only represent a simple count of 
the various judgments found in the current literature. Overall, the evidence base indicates 
a general level of support for the mirroring hypothesis, although it also suggests that 
mirroring involves more than one simple linkage between product and organization 
across all levels. A more nuanced understanding of mirroring is thus needed. Moreover, 
the evidence base also reveals that cross-over across disciplines is limited. Except the few 
seminal articles that are sometimes cited across disciplinary boundary, e.g., Baldwin and 
Clark (2000) and Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), researchers seldom make reference to 
studies outside of their disciplines. Consequently, research on the mirroring hypothesis is 
on divergent paths across disciplines, with different literatures adopting distinct 
definitions and focusing primarily on different units of analysis. As a first step toward 
synthesis, the next section addresses the first review objective by identifying the ways in 
which definitions of modularity in the extant literature differ, and what these differences 
mean in terms of mirroring. The section that follows addresses the second review 
objective by contextualizing observations of mirroring across different literatures so that 
the evidence base can be better synthesized.  
2.2.2 Meanings of Modularity 
Modularity as it is being used encompasses a plurality of meanings. To assess the 
ways in which interpretations of modularity differ in the extant literature, the included 
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articles are carefully analyzed to extract the contents and sources of the definitions 
provided. For those articles that do not provide explicit definitions of modularity, 
empirical operationalizations are extracted instead. Definitional elements are then 
reconstructed to capture the intended meanings reflected in the operationalizations.  
The extracted contents appear to be similar or even logically equivalent at first, 
but subtle differences emerge upon more reflection. To make sense of these differences, 
the extracted contents are broken down into their elements and categorized. These 
definitional elements can be categorized into three types9 - (1) description of the defining 
attributes of modularity (e.g., loose coupling, one-to-one function-component mapping), 
(2) description of the process through which the properties of modularity are created 
(e.g., information hiding, interface specification), and (3) heuristics that can be applied to 
assess the degree of modularity10 (e.g., the extent of interface standardization). Along 
with citation information, the extracted definitions are thematically analyzed and 
clustered into four groups of similar meanings and origins.  
1. Modularity as loose coupling or near decomposability. The first group of 
definitions focuses on the defining attributes of modularity. Drawing on seminal works 
on complex systems, these definitions describe modularity as a special form of design 
which exhibits loose coupling (Orton and Weick, 1990; Weick, 1976), near 
                                                
9 Many extracted definitions include more than one type of definitional elements.  
 
10 These elements are therefore more operational than conceptual. Viswanathan (2005) points out 
that the level of abstraction is an important consideration in the development of theoretical 
constructs. Constructs that are too concrete might not be useful for theoretical generalization, 
even though their measurement can be more direct. Therefore, these heuristic definitional 
elements might only reveal specific aspects of the multidimensional meanings of modularity.  
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decomposability (Simon, 1962), or creates system decomposition into parsimoniously 
linked subsystems (Alexander, 1964). By and large, these definitions consider modularity 
as synonymous with loose coupling and near decomposability, which constitute the 
foundational properties of modularity11. However, these foundational properties might be 
too abstract to tell us much about the tangible structural characteristics associated with 
modular systems. In fact, Simon, (1962) comments on the observed ubiquity of 
modularity and suggests that perhaps the perceptual and analytical limits of human 
cognition prevent us from ever observing the inner structures of non-modular complex 
systems12. In this sense, modularity might be perceptually ubiquitous as it is a reflection 
of how human cognition works (Callebaut, 2005). This philosophical puzzle 
notwithstanding, clearly there are observable hence definable attributes that could 
characterize different degrees of modularity.   
To bring the conceptualization down to a more concrete level, some definitions in 
this group describe more measurable characteristics directly derived from the 
foundational properties. For instance, MacCormack and coauthors (2006, 2012) 
conceptualize and measure modularity in product design by the potential for a design 
change in one component to propagate to other components. Modularity is thus defined 
                                                
11 Much of the modularity literature treats loose coupling and near decomposability as synonyms. 
Notably, Orton and Weick (1990) make a distinction between a dialectical interpretation and a 
unidimensional interpretation of loose coupling. According to this distinction, near 
decomposability is a unidimensional interpretation of loose coupling. Except when this 
distinction is explicitly invoked, this review follows the rest of the literature and uses these two 
terms interchangeably.  
 
12 Simon (1962: 478) concedes that this is a chicken and egg problem that he shall not try to 
settle: “whether we are able to understand the world because it is hierarchic or whether it appears 
hierarchic because those aspects of it which are not elude our understanding and observation. I 
have already given some reasons for supposing that the former is at least half the truth - that 
evolving complexity would tend to be hierarchic - but it may not be the whole truth.”  
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as the reverse of the potential for design change propagation. This characterization of 
product modularity is logically consistent with loose coupling and near decomposability, 
but grounded in the more tangible context of product design.  
Other definitions in this group also describe various desirable properties that are 
frequently associated (and often used interchangeably) with modularity. For instance, a 
common survey item for product modularity asks the respondents to assess the extent of 
component reusability, i.e., using the same component design across different product 
systems (e.g., Bush, Tiwana, and Rai, 2010; Worren, Moore, and Cardona, 2002). 
However, component reusability is not logically equivalent to the foundational properties. 
In addition to the foundational properties, component reusability requires compatibility 
across product systems, which imposes additional design constraints on all components 
intended to be reused13. Therefore, near decomposability is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for component reusability. Despite the common association in the literature, not 
all modular components are reusable; but all reusable components are modular. Attributes 
that are similarly associated with modularity include component substitutability, i.e., the 
ability to use a variety of qualified components to satisfy a system function (e.g., Garud 
and Kumaraswamy, 1995), and "mixing and matching" of components, i.e., the ability to 
combine qualified components in various ways to compose different system architectures 
(e.g., Bush et al., 2010; Schilling, 2000). These characterizations are often implicitly and 
erroneously assumed to be equivalent to loose coupling or near decomposability. These 
findings can be summarized as follows: 
                                                
13 Essentially, component reusability requires standardization. However, standardization has its 
own issues as a defining attribute of modularity as discussed in later section.  
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Finding 1: Loose coupling / near decomposability is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for component reusability, component substitutability, and "mixing and 
matching" of components14. 
These nuanced distinctions have important implications in terms of the reliability 
of measurement. For instance, the survey instrument in Worren et al. (2002) has four 
items for product modularity, with α = 0.64. The item component reusability has a 
factor loading of 0.82; the item degree of component carry-over has a factor loading of 
0.74; however, the item we can make changes in key components without redesigning 
others, arguably the more essential attribute of modularity in terms of loose coupling and 
mirroring, only has a factor loading of 0.39. The remaining item, our products have been 
decomposed into separate modules, has a factor loading of 0.51. These factor loadings 
indicate that what practitioners commonly understand as modular in specific contexts is 
not always consistent with the specific interpretations of modularity associated with 
mirroring between product and organization.  
In sum, this discussion shows that there are nuanced differences among different 
interpretations of modularity. Beyond the broad consensus on loose coupling and near 
decomposability, we do not (and perhaps will not) have complete agreement on the 
precise defining attributes of modularity. Modularity as it is being used is not just a 
multidimensional concept encapsulating a bundle of characteristics; the exact meanings 
also vary, in subtle but consequential ways, across the extant literature. This plurality of 
                                                
14 Reusability, substitutability, and mixing and matching are highly interrelated but nonetheless 
distinct properties. Reusability refers to reusing the same component design across multiple 
product systems, whereas substitutability refers to substituting different components for a given 
product system. Mixing and matching requires both reusability and substitutability. The 
underpinning condition is the varying scope of compatibility of the standardized interface 
specifications.  
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meanings, along with the conflation of distinct mirroring mechanisms, reflects our 
current incomplete knowledge on mirroring between product and organization.  
2. Modularity as interface standardization. The second group of definitions is an 
influential variant of the first group. Building on the same foundational properties of 
loose coupling and near decomposability, Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) expand the 
definition of modularity to include standardization of component interface specification. 
Standardized component interfaces, they maintain, help create loosely coupled 
component designs because these components can be developed relatively independently 
so long as they conform to the standardized component interface specifications. 
Standardized interfaces thus play an important coordinating role for mirroring between 
product and organization. Similarly, Baldwin and Clark (2000) state that modularization 
requires product designers to partition design parameters into two categories: visible 
information that specifies how potential interactions across modules will be handled, and 
hidden information that only affects the functioning of the local modules. This 
segregation enables loose coupling and must be maintained throughout the development 
process, i.e., it must be standardized. Importantly, this conception of modularity begins to 
bring attention to the process that creates the defining properties of modularity, thus 
rendering more concrete and operational definitions.  
Subsequently, many researchers adopt this emphasis on interface standardization 
as a defining attribute of modularity (e.g., Argyres and Bigelow, 2010; Jacobs et al., 
2011; Tiwana, 2008a, 2008b). As a result, the extent of interface standardization becomes 
a common measure of modularity. However, a growing body of empirical findings shows 
that interface standardization alone does not create loosely coupled components 
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(Cabigiosu, Zirpoli, and Camuffo, 2013; Chuma, 2006; Kotabe, Parente, and Murray, 
2007; Staudenmayer, Tripsas, and Tucci, 2005; Takeishi, 2002; Tidd, 1995). In 
particular, Staudenmayer et al. report: 
While an environment of interfirm modularity should in theory eliminate 
interdependencies among firms since interfaces between products are defined ex-
ante, the present study found, ironically, that interdependencies were ubiquitous. 
Interdependencies continually emerged throughout the product development 
process, despite efforts to limit them (2005: 303). 
In fact, a more careful reading of Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and Baldwin and 
Clark (2000) would reveal that these works do not suggest that interface standardization 
alone creates loosely coupled component design and organization. Specifically, Sanchez 
and Mahoney assert that: 
To fully specify component interfaces in a modular product architecture, a firm 
must have, or have access to, advanced architectural knowledge about relevant 
components and their interactions (1996: 70, emphasis in the original). 
Baldwin and Clark similarly state: 
As the properties of the system and the modules become better understood, the 
design rules will tend to become more complete. Then, as more of the innate 
interdependencies come to be addressed in the design rules, integration and 
testing of the system will become more cut-and-dried. Eventually, this part of the 
process may become so standardized and so simple that users themselves can take 
over the tasks of integrating and testing their own systems (2000: 77). 
These passages clearly suggest that interface standardization not informed by adequate 
knowledge on component interactions would not reduce component coupling. To 
illustrate this idea, consider the two examples of task partitioning provided by von Hippel 
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(1990: 440). The first partitioning has firm X responsible for the design of the aircraft 
body, and firm Y responsible for the design of the engine. The second partitioning has 
firm X responsible for designing the front half of the aircraft body and engine, and firm Y 
responsible for the back half of each. Clearly, standardizing the task interface in the 
second partitioning would not reduce the needed interactions between firm X and Y.  
Importantly, standardization of component interfaces creates the necessary 
information stability needed to decouple component designs and reduce organizational 
interdependencies (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996); however, subsequent research has 
since forgotten the important premise of having advanced architectural knowledge about 
relevant component interactions. Not all interface standardizations achieve loosely 
coupled product and organization designs. Therefore, this review also finds: 
Finding 2: Standardization of component interface specifications is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for loosely coupled product and organization designs. 
Standardized interfaces must be informed by adequate architectural knowledge 
about relevant components and their interactions in order to achieve loose 
coupling.  
This finding can be stated alternatively as 
Corollary: Incomplete knowledge of component interactions reduces the extent of 
mirroring between product and organization. 
Moreover, Chuma (2006) points out that there is a conceptual distinction between 
"perfect modularity"15 à la Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and Baldwin and Clark (2000) 
vis-à-vis what he labels "interim modularity," which is the interface specification adopted 
during trial-and-error development or prototyping phases as a tool to orchestrate 
                                                
15 Chuma (2006) uses “perfect modularity” and “ex ante modularity” interchangeably.  
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dispersed specialists to collectively learn about the "innate interdependencies" and 
emerging system architecture. Chuma (2006) states that the primary purpose of interim 
modularity is the facilitation of collective sensemaking, which is considered as "another 
power of modularity." Thus, the presence of codified interface specifications does not 
necessarily indicate the presence of adequate knowledge about component interactions to 
achieve loose coupling. In fact, interim modularity is frequently associated with reduced 
organizational modularity since collective learning would require more (not less) 
coordination (Ernst, 2005). Chuma's (2006) conceptual distinction thus helps resolve an 
important contradiction in the literature. Accordingly, measuring modularity by assessing 
the extent of interface standardization alone is likely to introduce considerable 
measurement error in terms of testing the mirroring relationship between product and 
organization.  
3. Modularity as one-to-one function-component mapping. The third group of 
definitions of modularity comes from research that focuses on product design and 
development, which imports a strong functional emphasis and much of the meanings of 
modularity from the engineering design literature (e.g., Cross, 2008; Pahl, Beitz, and 
Wallace, 1996: 1; Suh, 1990, 2001, 2005). Functions rightly play a central role in this 
literature since they are the intended reasons behind the existence of all engineering 
products (Hirtz et al., 2002; Taura and Yoshikawa, 1994). These scholars conceptualize 
product design as an iterative mapping process that “zigzags” between the functional and 
physical domains (Clark, 1985; Fixson, 2002; Suh, 1990). Accordingly, this group of 
definitions conceptualizes product architecture as the scheme by which the functions of a 
product system are allocated to physical components; and modular architecture as 
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characterized by a one-to-one mapping from functional elements to physical components 
(Ulrich, 1995)16. In similar terms, Ulrich (1994: 220) posits that modularity encapsulates 
two characteristics: (1) similarity between the physical and functional architectures of the 
design; and (2) minimization of incidental interactions among physical components.  
This functional emphasis is distinct from the typical definitional emphases in the 
mainstream management literature on modularity. Management scholars are primarily 
concerned with the organizing principles that effectively govern organizational activities. 
They find product functions to be “inherently manifold and nonstationary” (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000: 63) in the contexts of organizational phenomena. Since coordinating 
interdependent activities stemming from all relevant sources is arguably the most 
fundamental task of management, management scholars prefer definitions of modularity 
based on a generalized notion of interdependencies (i.e., loose coupling, near 
decomposability, and their various derivatives). Generalizing interdependencies means 
considering interdependencies of different kinds as instances of a generic notion of 
interdependencies, which provides a conceptually stationary unit of analysis to study the 
structural features and organizing principles that help manage interdependent 
organizational activities (e.g., Thompson, 1967).  
However, the conceptual relationships between definitions with these distinct 
emphases remain unestablished. Specifically, we need to establish whether Ulrich’s 
(1994) characteristics of modularity are logically compatible with the foundational 
                                                
16 Note that Ulrich (1995) also states that modular architecture needs to specify decoupled 
interfaces between components. It is therefore a two-part definition in terms of both elements and 
interfaces.  
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properties of loose coupling and near decomposability, or whether they actually reflect 
distinct interpretations. 
Physical and functional similarity. Functional decomposition is the process of 
successively breaking down a complex problem into its constituent parts by resolving the 
functional relationships among them17. It is indispensable to product development (Pahl 
et al., 1996; Taura and Yoshikawa, 1994) as a "divide and conquer" method that reduces 
the scope and complexity of individual design tasks so that they can be feasibly assigned 
to boundedly rational design teams. Moreover, functional decomposition also depicts the 
necessary component interactions (i.e., the functional relationships) that contribute to the 
overall system functionality. Therefore, a product system can be described 
parsimoniously by a collection of functional elements and the way these elements are 
linked together (Ulrich 1994). In Sanchez and Mahoney's (1996) language, functional 
decomposition generates the component interface specifications. If the physical 
architecture of a product system is designed to mirror functional decomposition, we 
would know that at least the intended interactions among the physical components consist 
of only those interactions critical to the system functionality. Thus, we can say that such a 
product design is intended to be loosely coupled or nearly decomposable. In other words, 
functional decomposition is an important first step in the process of modularization.  
Minimization of incidental interactions. However, even if the physical 
architecture of a product system corresponds to its functional architecture in a one-to-one 
                                                
17 Note that a product system can be functionally decomposed in many different ways, which 
potentially can produce different system qualities. Functional decomposition is thus a part of 
conceptual design process and is often informed by extant architectural knowledge. Product 
design is not confined to the physical domain only.  
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manner, in reality, there might still be many insidious, incidental interactions among the 
physical components. These interactions could remain unknown and unnoticed for much 
(or all) of the product development (Sosa et al., 2004). Ulrich (1994) gives the example 
of common automobile design in which the heat produced by the engine will influence 
the seal on the water pump in a way entirely incidental to the functions of either the 
engine or the water pump. Elimination of these incidental interactions thus makes the 
product system more loosely coupled or nearly decomposable. It also helps ensure the 
integrated product system actually performs as intended. Therefore, finding and 
eliminating or otherwise preventing incidental interactions is another important step in 
the process of modularization.  
This discussion illustrates that the definition of modularity as one-to-one function-
component mapping is logically consistent with the foundational properties. Moreover, 
this definition is also compatible with the definition of modularity as interface 
standardization. In addition, adopting the functional perspective provides a number of 
nuanced insights to our understanding of modularity and mirroring.  
First, adopting the functional perspective provides a framework that explicitly 
incorporates design intentions into the analysis of product development. Such a 
framework also helps make clear the distinction between the intended and the 
unintended, incidental component interactions. This distinction suggests that our 
conception of architectural knowledge should be expanded to include not only knowledge 
about relevant components and their designed interactions, but also about the undesirable 
and unintended component interactions to be eliminated or prevented. Therefore, in 
practice, architectural knowledge actually contains more contents than our literature 
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currently recognizes. In addition, unintended component interactions are difficult to 
uncover by loosely coupled organizational units focused on their own component 
development. Some level of organizational integration is required in order to carry out the 
joint discovery of unintended component interactions. As a result, how a product 
development organization uncovers and eliminates incidental component interactions 
would have significant implications on the extent of mirroring between product and 
organization.  
Second, defining modularity from the functional perspective also brings more 
clarity to the complex process of modularization. Particularly, Ulrich's (1994, 1995) two-
part definition suggests that distinct design activities are carried out to achieve specific 
attributes of modularity. Importantly, achieving one modular attribute does not 
necessarily achieve others. Sako (2004) therefore asserts that modularity is a 
multidimensional bundle of attributes that is difficult to rank along a unidimensional 
modular-integral spectrum. To illustrate this assertion, Sako asks: 
[I]s a product architecture with a one-to-one mapping from functions to 
components but without decoupled interfaces more or less modular than a product 
architecture with a many-to-one mapping from functions to components with 
decoupled interfaces? (ibid., p. 232)  
This line of reasoning reveals that defining modularity based on a generalized notion of 
interdependencies might have flattened and obscured the multidimensionality of the 
underpinning constitutive processes. As it turns out, this issue on dimensionality, which 
will be discussed in detail in the next subsection, has important implications on our 
understanding of modularity and mirroring.   
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4. Modularity as reduction in post-assembly system fine-tuning. The fourth 
group of definitions identified in this review is a small but interesting set of 
interpretations worthy of more attention, since it reveals important but little-known 
distinctions. The idea, originated in (Fujimoto, 2001) and elaborated further by Chuma 
(2006), is that the need to perform post-assembly system fine-tuning is a defining 
characteristic of an integral architecture because system fine-tuning entails mutual 
adjustments of component configurations, which therefore requires knowledge beyond 
component boundary. According to this interpretation, the defining characteristic of a 
modular architecture is that the total performance of the assembled product system can be 
automatically guaranteed if the specified performance of the constituent components is 
assured ex ante (ibid.). Therefore, assembly of modular systems should be a simple 
matter of putting the modules together. Modular components are supposed to just “plug 
and play.” In other words, modular systems are those that have found ways of evading 
the nonlinearities of complexity that could arise out of unpredictable or reciprocal 
component interactions (Langlois, 2006).  
This interpretation of modularity is a significant departure from the mainstream 
view. In particular, this interpretation explicitly assumes the perspective of a systems 
integrator. Modularity is conceptualized as the extent to which a component can be 
treated as a “black box” in the context of systems integration. For example, PC assembly 
does not involve much more than physically connecting the commodity components. The 
more modular a component, the less component knowledge is required of the systems 
integrators to incorporate such a component into the overall system.  
34 
 
Notably, this alternative interpretation of modularity would consider aircraft, 
automobile, and computer operating systems integral systems (Chuma, 2006: 405), 
whereas mainstream interpretations would consider these products modular systems 
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996: 67). The point of departure between these interpretations 
is that while many components in these product systems can be developed more or less 
independently following standardized component interface specifications (i.e., modular 
component design), substantial post-assembly system fine-tuning is still required in order 
to achieve the desired system-level performance. Systems integrators thus play a critical 
role in the production of these product systems.  
Importantly, the distinction between system fine-tuning and interdependent 
component designs is a subtle but critical one. Specifically, system fine-tuning does not 
change the designs of the components involved; it only changes the configurations of 
these components within the range of component variation that the standardized interface 
specifications allow. For instance, fine-tuning an automobile might involve mutual 
adjustments of the carburetor and the ignition system to produce the desired performance 
profiles. However, it does not involve a redesign of either the carburetor or the ignition 
system. This subtle distinction has an important implication - namely, even for the very 
same product system, product modularity as experienced by component developers and 
product modularity as experienced by systems integrators need not always be the same.  
This claim might appear to be somewhat counter-intuitive. On the surface, both 
system fine-tuning and interdependent component design reflect interdependencies across 
components. However, not all interdependencies are of the same kind. Interdependencies 
exist in all dimensions of a complex system. The dimensions of interdependencies most 
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relevant to component developers might not always be the same as those most relevant to 
systems integrators.  
Specifically, in addition to functional interdependencies, systems integration also 
depends critically on knowledge about performance interdependencies across 
components. Certainly, functional and performance dimensions are not orthogonal. 
Critical performance interdependencies are often captured as part of the functional 
requirements. However, there is no reason to presume that the patterns of 
interdependencies in these dimensions should be identical. This observation is consistent 
with the main finding of the systems integration literature that integrators often possess 
knowledge in excess of what they need for what they make because they need to account 
for additional dimensions of interdependencies (Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2001a). It is also consistent with the life-cycle perspective of modularity 
(Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Fixson, 2003; Gershenson, Prasad, and Allamneni, 
1999), which emphasizes the changing modularization objectives throughout a product’s 
development life-cycle phases (design for manufacturing, design for logistics, design for 
time-to-market, etc.). In fact, a complex system can simultaneously exhibit different 
patterns of interdependencies in different dimensions. (For an illustration of this claim, 
consider figure 2.2.) Since modularity is a concept about the pattern of cross-component 
interdependencies, I find 
Finding 3: A complex system can simultaneously exhibit different degrees of 
modularity in different dimensions. Therefore, a unidimensional conception of 
modularity based on a generalized notion of interdependencies underspecifies the 
underlying multidimensional structure of interdependencies. 
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Recognizing the multidimensionality of interdependencies requires us to rethink 
how we formulate the mirroring hypothesis. If a complex system can simultaneously 
exhibit different degrees of modularity in different dimensions, what really constitutes 
mirroring or lack of mirroring between product and organization? For instance, consider 
Henry Ford's introduction of assembly line manufacturing to automobile production. 
Product architecture was more or less the same after the adoption of assembly line 
manufacturing; however, organizational structure was radically transformed. In this case, 
the structure of functional interdependencies remained stable; the structure of production 
process interdependencies became much more modular. Mirroring is thus between 
production process and organizational structure. This example illustrates that we need a 
more nuanced statement of mirroring beyond structural correspondence between product 
and organization since product architecture only embodies a subset of interdependencies 
that impinge on organizational design.  
Summary.  This review identifies four clusters of definitions of modularity in 
the extant literature. Despite a general consensus on the foundational properties of loose 
coupling and near decomposability, substantial variations and ambiguity remain in the 
ways in which modularity is defined and interpreted. In particular, this analysis reveals 
that many attributes commonly associated with modularity in the literature actually 
describe additional dimensions of characteristics beyond the foundational properties (e.g., 
reusability, substitutability, etc.). Moreover, these attributes call for distinct design 
considerations, which hold different implications on the needed organizational 
coordination to carry out the distinct design tasks. Therefore, one key finding of this 
review is that not all interpretations of modularity characterize the structural patterns 
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associated with the observations of mirroring between product and organization. 
Mirroring thus needs a more precise specification.  
One important reason for the imprecision in the current specification is the 
literature's tendency to drift toward unidimensional interpretations of complex constructs 
(Orton and Weick, 1990). Such interpretations of modularity generalize 
interdependencies and collapse their dimensionality, which obscures the salient structural 
features upon which various mirroring forces operate and consequently weakens the 
explanatory value of modularity. To address this deficiency, the next section attends to 
the second review objective by contextualizing observations of mirroring (or lack of 
mirroring) so that the forces operating on multiple dimensions of interdependencies can 
be systematically compared and contrasted with one another.  
2.2.3 Contexts of Mirroring 
1. Mirroring mechanisms. An emerging consensus about mirroring is that there is 
no simple deterministic link between product and organization architectures (Cabigiosu et 
al., 2013; Ernst, 2005; Fixson and Park, 2008; Hoetker, 2006; Sako, 2004). Multiple 
causal explanations have been invoked to explain mirroring. The evidence base provides 
an opportunity to systematically review the literature’s current understanding of the 
mirroring mechanisms. Accordingly, three clusters of theoretical explanations for 
mirroring can be identified:  
Coordination explanations. The first cluster explains mirroring in terms of the 
coordination or communication structures of organizations as a result of information 
processing or knowledge management. For instance, Conway (1968) states that 
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organizations are constrained to produce products whose structures reflect the existing 
communication structures of the organizations (i.e., product mirrors organization). On the 
other hand, Sanchez and Mahoney (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) maintain that 
coordination tasks implicit in specific product designs largely determine the feasible 
organization designs for developing those products (i.e., organization mirrors product). In 
addition, Cataldo et al. (2006) demonstrate that achieving congruence between 
coordination requirements, which is determined by technical dependencies, and 
coordination activities, which determine organizational dependencies, reduces product 
development time (i.e., product and organization mirror each other). Therefore, whether it 
is a one-way constraint from either direction or a two-way constraint between product 
and organization, these researchers point out that the need to efficiently coordinate 
technical and organizational dependencies is an important mirroring mechanism. 
It is worth noting that many studies that produce findings against the mirroring 
hypothesis (e.g., Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Brusoni, 2005; Cabigiosu et al., 2013; 
Chuma, 2006; Ernst, 2005) also explain the contradictory findings through coordination 
explanations. These studies maintain that modularization requires more (not less) 
coordination if the underpinning technologies keep changing fast and unpredictably 
(Ernst, 2005) or if the inherent complexity of the product systems exceeds certain 
threshold (e.g., Cabigiosu et al., 2013). Therefore, we still need to establish the boundary 
conditions on product modularity’s role as a functional equivalent of overt managerial 
coordination.   
Incentive explanations. The second cluster draws on a variety of theories from the 
organizational economics literature to explain mirroring. For instance, Cabigiosu and 
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Camuffo (2012) and Hoetker (2006) maintain that buyers of modular components are less 
likely to suffer from hold-up problems because the presence of other modular component 
suppliers helps curb opportunism, which in turn promotes the use of arm’s length 
transaction. Similarly, Garud and Kumaraswamy (1995) submit that the presence of open 
standards, which indicates high inter-firm product modularity, reduces transaction costs 
and promotes market governance. These studies can be considered a part of the empirical 
transaction cost economics literature. Product modularity serves as an empirical 
apparatus to assess the risk of opportunism. Accordingly, theoretical extensions to 
transaction cost economics can point to unexplored contingencies on mirroring at the 
interfirm level for future research. For example, governance inseparability (Argyres and 
Liebeskind, 1999), the condition in which a firm’s past governance choices constrain the 
range and types of future governance choices, implies that that there will be variance in 
observed governance mechanisms among firms for a given transaction. Kang, Mahoney, 
and Tan’s (2009) real-option extension suggests that positive inter-project spillovers can 
explain deviations from standard transaction cost predictions. Thus, some observations of 
“broken mirrors” at the interfirm level might be explained by dynamic adjustment costs 
or real-option values.      
In addition, Susarla, Barua, and Whinston (2010) draw upon agency theory and 
contend that modularity improves the verifiability of inter-firm tasks and therefore 
increases the desirability of high-powered incentives in such transactions. Similarly, 
Baiman, Fischer, and Rajan (2001) suggest that modular product architecture improves a 
firm’s ability to trace the responsibility for its product’s failures to the component 
suppliers. Moreover, Novak and Eppinger (2001) and Henkel and Baldwin (2011) argue 
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that modularity helps better define property rights so firms can capture the benefits of 
their investment in specialized components. In sum, the second cluster explains mirroring 
as the result of the various ways in which product modularity improves incentive 
alignment between transacting partners. Future research can extend theses incentive 
explanations by connecting with the sociology literature on cooperation, given the 
increasing interests in the implications of mirroring in the context of open source 
software development (e.g., MacCormack, Baldwin, and Rusnak, 2012).      
Competitive explanations. The third cluster explains mirroring as the results of 
various competitive dynamics of technological change. For instance, Langlois and 
Robertson (1992) contend that modular systems enable firms to take advantage of 
external economies, which provide the competitive advantage that explains the increasing 
prevalence of modular industry structure. Sturgeon (2002) similarly maintains that the 
key advantage of modular production networks is the build-up of external economies of 
scale. These accounts suggest that product modularity provides important cost advantage. 
On the other hand, Fixson and Park (2008) observe that new and superior integral product 
architectures can provide performance advantage that pushes the entire industry to 
become more integrated. To reconcile these opposing forces, Christensen, Verlinden, and 
Westerman (2002) maintain that whether performance or cost advantage would dominate 
depends on whether the customers are under-served or over-served by the functionality or 
performance available from products in the markets. In summary, change in product 
architecture can result in change in the performance and cost profiles of the product, 
which has competitive implications that alter the locus of competition and hence the 
structure of an industry.   
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Among the 36 studies18 that examine mirroring at the within-firm level only, all 
of them rely on coordination explanations to explain mirroring. 34 studies appeal to 
coordination explanations exclusively, with the remaining 2 studies also discussing 
incentive mechanisms, but only tangentially. It is thus safe to say that the current 
literature considers coordination the predominant mirroring mechanism at the within-firm 
level.  
Among the 39 studies that examine mirroring at the inter-firm level, 36 make 
reference to coordination as a mirroring mechanism. Coordination thus remains an 
important explanation for mirroring at the inter-firm level. However, unlike the within-
firm studies, only 15 studies rely on coordination explanations as the exclusive mirroring 
mechanism. 23 studies rely on incentive alignment as the primary explanation for 
mirroring.  
Among the 32 industry-level studies, 27 make reference to coordination as an 
explanatory mechanism (8 of them exclusively), 18 make reference to incentive 
alignment as an explanatory mechanism (no exclusive use of incentive alignment as 
explanation), and 5 make reference to various competitive dynamics as the explanatory 
mechanism (no exclusive use of competitive dynamics as explanation). Coordination 
remains an important mirroring mechanism at the industry level, though the type of 
explanations provided is observably more diverse.  
                                                
18 As reported earlier, 43 studies examine within-firm mirroring; however, only 36 of them 
examine within-firm level mirroring exclusively. I remove multi-level studies for this count in 
order to see if incentive explanations are also used at within-firm level.   
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Therefore, the evidence base suggests that although coordination explains the 
majority of mirroring, at higher levels, mirroring between product and organization 
results from the interaction of a variety of forces. This finding is consistent with 
Chesbrough's (2003) assertion that modular product design is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for market modularity19. Therefore, modularity actually conveys 
different meanings or conditions at different levels. Failure to make these distinctions 
contributes to the inconsistent empirical findings in the current literature. Consequently, 
the mirroring hypothesis begins to fall apart when conceptualized as a simple 
deterministic relationship between concrete structural features of product and 
organization, rather than an outcome of dynamic interactions among multiple dimensions 
of interdependencies.  
2. Industry contexts. A revisionist critique of the literature on the mirroring 
hypothesis is that it has the tendency to generalize empirical observations that are 
context-specific (Ernst, 2005). In particular, the computer industry has become the 
paradigmatic example of the mirroring hypothesis (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Langlois, 
1992; Langlois and Robertson, 1992). This industry emphasis has to some extent biased 
the rest of the research (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010), which therefore calls into 
question the generalizability of the proposed relationship beyond the computer industry. 
                                                
19 Specifically, Chesbrough (2003) draws on the institutional conditions that market needs to be 
able to function and posits that four criteria must be met for internal and market modularity to 
converge: (1) diffusion of architectural knowledge, (2) shared concepts and codes to specify 
component attributes, (3) existence of tools and equipment to verify component attributes, and (4) 
existence of capable supplier base. These criteria indicate that many institutional arrangements 
need to be in place before an internal modular design can become widely available commodity 
components. 
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The extent to which market or industry specific factors affect the mirroring relationship 
thus remains an important unanswered question (Cabigiosu et al., 2013).  
Categorizing findings into specific industry contexts, this review finds significant 
differences in the support for the mirroring hypothesis across industries. Specifically, 
among 48 empirical studies20 with clearly defined industry contexts, 23 studies examine 
mirroring in the computer industry. 19 of the 23 studies find direct, indirect, or contingent 
support for the mirroring hypothesis; the remaining 4 studies produce contradictory 
evidence (17.39%). Among the 25 studies that examine industries other than the 
computer industry, 12 studies find direct, indirect, or contingent support for the mirroring 
hypothesis; 13 studies produce contradictory findings (52.00%). Clearly, the extant body 
of empirical evidence lends significantly more support to the mirroring hypothesis in the 
computer industry. Furthermore, breaking down the counts into industry subcategories 
reveals even sharper contrast. Among 16 studies that examine mirroring in software 
development, 15 studies find support; and only 1 study produces contradictory finding 
(6.25%). On the other end of the extreme, among 12 studies that examine mirroring in the 
automotive industry, 5 studies produce supportive conclusions, whereas 7 studies produce 
contradictory findings (58.33%). These numbers suggest that industry specific factors 
might play a significant role in the mirroring mechanisms.  
To uncover industry specific factors that impinge on the underpinning mirroring 
processes, the studies that produce contradictory evidence are content analyzed to extract 
the rationales given to support the findings. The extracted rationales are then compared 
with the mainstream narratives of mirroring, as well as observations of mirroring in the 
                                                
20 This count only includes empirical studies with clearly defined industry contexts, which 
therefore reports different numbers from those reported in section 2.2.1.  
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software industry. This comparative analysis reveals the following critical distinctions 
across industries.  
Distinct approaches to mitigate incidental interactions. As Ulrich (1994) and 
Sosa et al. (2004) point out, incidental interactions among modular components are 
inevitable and could remain unnoticed for much of the product development. These 
unknown interactions could result in costly “glitches,” which create reciprocal task 
dependencies that require organizational integration to resolve (Hoopes and Postrel, 
1999). Therefore, as discussed earlier, incomplete knowledge of component interactions 
(i.e., increased likelihood of incidental interactions) reduces mirroring between product 
and organization.  
Many studies that provide evidence against the mirroring hypothesis report 
significant presence of incidental interactions. For instance, Staudenmayer et al. (2005) 
report that incidental interactions continually emerge despite efforts to limit them. Ro, 
Liker, and Fixson’s (2007, 2008) case studies of the U.S. auto industry reveal that 
product modularity does not eliminate reciprocal task dependencies among firms. 
Similarly, Zirpoli and Camuffo (2009) show that intense information sharing between 
firms is a non-substitutable means to achieve coordination. Altogether, these studies 
suggest that, in settings similar to the auto industry, modular product architectures do not 
necessarily lead to the organizational benefits promised by the mainstream modularity 
literature.  
Some researchers suggest that the inherent complexity of automobiles is the 
reason why product modularity is not an effective functional equivalent of overt 
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managerial coordination (Cabigiosu et al., 2013; Ro et al., 2007, 2008). These 
researchers maintain that the complexity of automobiles entails high likelihood of 
incidental interactions. However, this line of reasoning fails to explain why the inherent 
complexity of software systems does not seem to generate the same level of coordination 
difficulty. Modern software systems can grow to millions of lines of code and require 
thousands of software developers. It is therefore hard to make a convincing argument that 
automobile development is necessarily more complex than software development.  
Other researchers suggest that there might be industry specific factors that restrict 
the degree to which product architectures can be modularized (Zirpoli and Becker, 2011). 
In fact, the product architecture of automobile has been characterized as persistently 
integral (MacDuffie, 2008). Comparatively, computer and other electronics seem 
particularly suitable to modularization (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sturgeon, 2002; Zirpoli 
and Becker, 2011). However, the industry specific factors have yet to be explicitly 
identified. 
Comparing between studies in the software and automotive industries reveals a 
critical distinction that might explain industry specificities in modularization. 
Importantly, I maintain that software development relies heavily on a fundamentally 
different approach to mitigate unknown component interactions. Instead of uncovering 
incidental interactions and managing them with mutual design adjustments, which is the 
typical approach in automotive or other non-computer industries, software development 
relies heavily on “thick module insulation” that guarantees any potential unwanted 
component interactions are effectively severed, even with no prior knowledge of their 
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potential occurrence. With unknown interactions preempted, software development 
organizations could remain loosely coupled despite incomplete architectural knowledge. 
Specifically, modern computer programming languages feature built-in syntactic 
supports21 for information hiding (Parnas, 1972). That is, attempts to access or 
manipulate the internal design of other software components are deemed syntactically 
incorrect and would not be allowed. Therefore, software component interfaces are not 
just coordination devices that merely express how components should interact; software 
interfaces are in fact also abstraction barriers (Abelson and Sussman, 1996) that enforce 
access restriction to component internals. If the same approach were to be applied to 
automotive design, every component would be wrapped with thick thermal insulation and 
motion damper to prevent unknown interactions across components. Clearly, this 
approach would not be feasible in automotive design.   
Importantly, using insulation to preempt interactions incurs performance or cost 
penalty. In the software engineering literature, this trade-off is known as abstraction 
penalty (Müller, 2000; Veldhuizen, 2004), which states that while high-level 
programming features make complex programming tasks simpler, they also produce less 
efficient software. Schilling’s general theory depicts this trade-off in terms of synergistic 
specificity, which is “the degree to which a system achieves greater functionality by its 
                                                
21 Two well-known examples of these syntactic supports for information hiding are scoping and 
encapsulation (Friedman, Wand, and Haynes, 2001; Pierce, 2002; Scott, 2000). Scoping refers to 
the rules concerning the visibility of entities in a program, thereby hiding information from 
program segments that are outside of the scope. Encapsulation is an object-oriented programming 
technique that restricts access to data and functions bundled inside an object. Violations of 
scoping or encapsulation rules trigger “compile-time errors,” which prevent the software systems 
from being built. In other words, these syntactic supports provide strong enforcement of modular 
design principles.  
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components being specific to one another” (2000: 316). Therefore, this analysis suggests 
that software development has a tendency to trade synergistic specificity for development 
simplicity in order to modularize development organization. In fact, much of the 
advancement in software engineering can be characterized as trading more and more 
computing resources for development simplicity so that developers can design 
increasingly complex software systems. 
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that this approach to mitigate unknown 
interactions is unique to the computer industry. Specifically, semiconductor technology 
has achieved million-fold cost reductions and performance improvements since its 
inception, an observation known as the Moore’s Law (Moore, 1965). The uniqueness of 
this performance trajectory can best be seen by projecting the growth pattern onto other 
technologies. Moore himself has jokingly mused: 
[I]f similar progress were made in transportation technologies such as air travel, a 
modern-day commercial aircraft would cost $500, circle the earth in 20 minutes, 
and use only five gallons of fuel. The catch is that it might be only the size of a 
shoe box. (as cited in Schaller, 1997: 58) 
This unique exponential performance trajectory is therefore an important industry 
specific factor that enables the distinct modularization process in the computer industry. 
With the million-fold cost reductions and performance improvements in the underpinning 
semiconductor technology, computer engineers afford to indiscriminately rely on thick 
module insulation to preempt unknown component interactions. Engineers in other 
industries are much more constrained by performance and cost limitations of the 
underpinning technologies. Therefore, product development in the computer industry 
could proceed while remaining relatively ignorant of potential incidental component 
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interactions vis-à-vis product development in other industries. Mirroring between product 
and organization is thus particularly strong in this industry. In summary, I suggest  
Finding 4: The ways in which incidental component interactions are mitigated 
strongly influence the extent of mirroring between product and organization. 
Specifically, mitigating incidental interactions preemptively by insulating 
components increases the extent of mirroring, but reduces synergistic specificity. 
Mitigating incidental interactions by collective learning and mutual design 
adjustments reduces the extent of mirroring, but improves synergistic specificity. 
Thus, product and organization are more likely to mirror each other when there is room to 
trade performance and cost for development simplicity. A corollary thus follows  
Corollary: The extent of mirroring between product and organization is inversely 
related to the extent to which the underpinning technologies are constrained by 
performance and cost limitations.  
Separation of design and manufacturing. This comparative analysis reveals 
another distinction across industries. Particularly, many studies outside of the software 
industry report that modularity initiatives are driven by objectives other than simplifying 
product development. For instance, Ro et al. (2007) report that manufacturing cost 
reduction is the primary driver for product modularity in the U.S. auto industry. Kotabe et 
al. (2007) report that modularity in the Brazilian auto industry is driven by the desires to 
seek lower labor cost, avoid strong labor unions, or reduce operational risks, among 
others. In addition, Cabigiosu and Camuffo (2012) observe strategic heterogeneity among 
air conditioning manufacturers pursuing product modularity, which can be associated 
with either more or less inter-firm organizational modularity depending on specific 
strategic intents. These findings are consistent with the life-cycle perspective 
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(Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Fixson, 2003; Gershenson et al., 1999), which 
maintains that the meanings and implications of modularity are relative to specific 
objectives throughout the development life-cycle. Together, these studies suggest that 
product modularity outside of the software industry is not always intended to bring about 
organizational modularity and therefore is not always associated with it.  
In comparison, studies in the software industry more consistently report that 
product modularity is primarily intended to simplify product development. I maintain the 
reason for this relative consistency in modularization objective is that software 
development entails no separation of design and manufacturing in its life-cycle. Unlike 
manufacturing of physical products, software systems are information-based and do not 
require physical materials and construction. Therefore, software firms do not need to 
manage material coordinating tasks, such as logistics of raw materials and manufacturing, 
which also influence organizational design. Unlike product development in other 
industries, complexity of software development arises primarily out of interdependencies 
in the design dimension. Consequently, software products as a design artifact embodies a 
larger subset of the relevant interdependencies that impinges on organizational design as 
compared with other types of products22. Mirroring is therefore stronger between 
software products and their development organizations.  
 Since the notion of mirroring between product and organization can trace its root 
to the software engineering literature (Conway, 1968), the idiosyncrasies of software 
                                                
22 This claim that software products embody more knowledge is evidenced by the fact that access 
to source code makes reproducing a functioning software system relatively trivial; but even with 
the blueprint to a complex car engine, most people would still be unable to reproduce a 
functioning engine.  
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might have biased subsequent research in other industries. Specifically, supporters of 
modularity seem to have implicitly accepted the idea that product modularity allows 
firms to easily decouple both design and manufacturing (Cabigiosu et al., 2013). This 
review suggests that the effects of product modularity are in fact more nuanced and 
specific to the intended objectives. Modularity in product design and modularity in 
manufacturing process are not connected through a simple, deterministic link, even 
though they are certainly interrelated23. Importantly, only a subset of the relevant 
organizational knowledge that enables a product design is embodied in and hence 
observable from the product artifact. Software product happens to be the exceptional case 
that has much of the design knowledge explicitly encoded in the artifact. Consequently, 
the structure of the artifact closely resembles the knowledge and hence task dependencies 
of the development organization. The observation of strong mirroring in the software 
industry is therefore more an exception rather than the rule. Accordingly, I submit  
Finding 5: The extent of mirroring between product and its development 
organization depends on the extent to which the product embodies the relevant 
interdependencies that impinge on the development tasks. The more the product 
artifact embodies these interdependencies, the stronger product and organization 
mirror each other.  
 Summary. This review identifies three types of mirroring mechanisms: 
coordination, incentive, and competitive. Although coordination explains the majority of 
mirroring, at higher level, mirroring between product and organization involves more 
causal forces. This hierarchy of nested mechanisms suggests that the meanings of product 
modularity also have a nested structure. In terms of coordination, product modularity is 
                                                
23 Refer to the example of Henry Ford’s assembly line manufacturing discussed earlier. 
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about the technical decomposition of a complex product system into loosely coupled 
components. In terms of incentive alignment, these loosely coupled components require 
additional institutional arrangements to function as fully modular components at the 
inter-firm level. Technical decomposition alone is therefore insufficient. Modular 
interface not only specifies how components should interact at the technical level, it also 
reflects how jointly created value is apportioned between the transacting firms. In terms 
of competitive explanation of mirroring, product modularity also denotes the market 
condition in which the locus of competition is well defined by the modular interface. 
 Comparative analysis across industries also reveals important insights. First, I 
submit that mirroring between product and organization depends not only on how 
modular the product is, but also on how the product is modularized. The trade-off 
between performance and cost versus organizational modularity sets an important 
boundary condition on product modularity’s role as a functional equivalent of overt 
managerial coordination. Second, this comparative analysis also calls into question the 
tacit assumption that product necessarily embodies all the organizational knowledge that 
goes into the development process. To the extent that product as a design artifact is only a 
partial embodiment of the underpinning knowledge, mirroring between the artifact and 
the organization that holds the enabling knowledge would always be incomplete.  
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In these figures, complex system is depicted by a network diagram. The nodes are 
elements in the system; and the lines connecting the nodes represent interdependencies. 
The colors of the lines represent specific dimensions. In figure (a.), all three dimensions 
are visible. It is hard to discern a clear pattern. In figure (b.), only the red dimension is 
made visible, and the picture clearly depicts four fully decomposed clusters. In figure 
(c.), only the blue dimension is made visible, and the picture shows a nearly 
decomposable system consisting of two loosely coupled clusters. In figure (d.), only the 
black dimension is made visible, and the picture shows a non-decomposable complex 
system. These diagrams illustrate that dimensionalizing a complex system can reveal in 
very different patterns of modularization. 
  
Figure 2.2 (a.) Figure 2.2 (b.) 
  
  
Figure 2.2 (c.) Figure 2.2 (d.) 
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CHAPTER 3 
TOWARD A CONTINGENT MODEL OF MIRRORING – A KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Much of the contemporary management literature on modularity subscribes to the 
idea that increased product modularity is associated with advantageous increases in 
organizational modularity (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; 
Jacobides, 2005; Langlois, 2002; MacCormack, Baldwin, and Rusnak, 2012; Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996; Sanchez, 1995, 1999; Sturgeon, 2002). Known as the mirroring 
hypothesis (Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Colfer, 2007; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), this 
proposed relationship states that the structure of a product development organization and 
the architecture of the product being developed would come to “mirror” each other. 
However, as the review in the previous chapter shows, empirical research to date has not 
consistently found support for the hypothesis.  
Moreover, extant theoretical discussions have not converged on a systematic 
explanation for the growing body of inconsistent empirical evidence.24 An emerging 
view suggests that the proposed correspondence between product and organization 
actually reflects a more multiplex phenomenon than previously recognized (Cabigiosu 
and Camuffo, 2012; Hoetker, 2006) and that there is no simple deterministic link between 
                                                
24 Colfer and Baldwin (2010) report that 31% of the empirical studies in their review sample find 
no support for, or contradict, the mirroring hypothesis.  
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product and organization (Cabigiosu et al., 2013; Ernst, 2005; Fixson and Park, 2008; 
Sako, 2004). Accordingly, leading scholars are calling for a more contingent model that 
goes beyond asking whether the mirroring hypothesis holds or not, but instead explains 
and predicts when the mirroring relationship will hold and when it will not (Cabigiosu 
and Camuffo, 2012; Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Sanchez and Mahoney, 2013).  
As a first step toward such a contingent model, this theory essay explores 
mirroring between product and organization at the within-firm level, which is the level of 
analysis in the original formulations of the mirroring hypothesis. Specifically, the 
proposed model is based on the premise that implicit assumptions underpinning the 
prediction of mirroring have been taken for granted and are in fact not always tenable. 
Therefore, a systematic examination of these implicit assumptions provides the basic 
structure for the theory development.   
This essay begins with a brief overview of the extant theories of mirroring at the 
within-firm level and highlights some points of agreement and departure. The following 
section then identifies exogenous and endogenous factors that lower the likelihood that 
the mirroring hypothesis will hold and builds the logic for several propositions. This 
essay then concludes with a discussion on the implications of the proposed contingent 
framework. 
 
3.2 Extant Theories of Mirroring 
 The idea that a relationship exists between product architecture and organization 
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structure was developed more or less independently in different literatures. In software 
engineering, Conway (1968) observes that organizations are constrained to produce 
product designs that are copies of the communication structures of these organizations. 
Conway’s (1968) reason for this constraint is that designers of different software 
components must communicate in order for these components to interface properly. This 
observation was later developed into the literature of socio-technical congruence, 
(Cataldo et al., 2006, 2008), which posits that product development endeavors form a 
socio-technical system and that coordination requirements (as determined by product 
designs) and actual coordination activities (as embodied in organization structure) should 
be matched.  
Similar ideas can be found in task dependency theory (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Chandler, 1962; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 
1967; Woodward, 1965) and the information-processing view of organization (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1995; Burton and Obel, 2004; Galbraith, 1974; Tushman and Nadler, 
1978) from the organizational theory literature, where it has long been recognized that 
organization designs should reflect the nature of the tasks to be performed (MacCormack 
et al., 2012). To the extent that product architecture determines the nature of design tasks, 
the mirroring hypothesis can be understood as an application of this organizing principle 
to product design and development (Colfer and Baldwin, 2010).  
In the contemporary management literature on modularity (e.g., Argyres and 
Bigelow, 2010; Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Hoetker, 2006), mirroring between 
product and organization has become a central topic. Researchers in this literature 
typically attribute the idea to the seminal works by Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and 
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Baldwin and Clark (2000), which focus on how modularity as a design strategy facilitates 
loose coupling (Orton and Weick, 1990; Weick, 1976) in product and organization 
designs. Particularly, these scholars maintain that advanced architectural knowledge, 
which is the higher-order knowledge about how a product system's components interact 
and the system implications of these interactions, enables the standardization of fully 
specified component interfaces (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) or design rules (Baldwin 
and Clark, 2000). These fully specified component interfaces act as a functional 
equivalent of overt managerial coordination. Organizational modularity is therefore an 
option that product modularity enables. Since organizational modularity is generally 
considered desirable, subsequent research often assumes product modularity would lead 
to organizational modularity. Notably, the notion of mirroring in this literature has come 
to acquire distinct meanings that emphasize and advocate for the advantages of 
modularity.  
Points of departure. While these theoretical accounts similarly predict structural 
correspondence between product architecture and organization structure, closer reading 
reveals significant differences among them. Specifically, extant theories appear to differ 
in the following ways: 
1. Direction of causality. The mirroring hypothesis is often presented as a 
correlational statement, i.e., it predicts correspondence but does not impose direction of 
causality (Colfer and Baldwin, 2010; Sako, 2004). Correlational statement allows a 
diversity of causal specifications, which helps the literature remain inclusive to different 
theoretical narratives, e.g., effects flowing from organization to product (Conway, 1968; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Sanchez, Galvin, and Bach, 2013), from product to 
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organization (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), or in both directions (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Fixson and Park, 2008; Sako, 2004). Therefore, the predicted correspondence 
might be the combined effect of multiple mechanisms.  
However, a correlational statement can mask causal details and create a false 
sense of determinism. For instance, subsequent research often cites Sanchez and 
Mahoney (1996) to put forth a simple correlational mirroring hypothesis; however, 
Sanchez and Mahoney’s (1996) original statement is in fact more nuanced, suggesting 
that product designs constrain25 feasible choices of organization designs. Specifically, 
Sanchez (1995) posits that integral product designs require integral organization designs, 
whereas modular product designs enable modular organization designs. Clearly, these 
carefully worded propositions leave room for contingent factors. Accordingly, Sako 
(2004) suggests product modularity gives greater scope for choice in organization design, 
but should not be understood as the sole determinant. The underpinning causal 
mechanisms are more complex than how mirroring is typically interpreted.  
2. Need for communication. Another seemingly contradictory positions among the 
extant theories concern whether mirroring results from the organizational need to 
facilitate communication between designers of different components (e.g., Cataldo et al., 
2006, 2008; Conway, 1968; Henderson and Clark, 1990) or from the elimination of such 
need through product modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 
2013). This apparent contradiction reflects two opposing perspectives on causal direction 
                                                
25 It is interesting that both Conway (1968) and Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), whose works 
appear to have been developed independently, use the word ‘constrain’ to depict the mirroring 
relationship. This choice of word suggests that these authors are conscious of other considerations 
that can impinge on product and organization designs.   
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(MacCormack et al., 2012). One perspective underscores the need to match patterns of 
communication to the technical interdependencies that specific product designs entail, i.e., 
organizations should mirror products; the opposing perspective assumes that an 
organization’s structure is fixed in the short-term and maintains that product designs are 
constrained by pre-existing communication channels, i.e., products would mirror 
organizations.  
Put succinctly, both perspectives agree that communication needs and 
organization structures should be matched; but they disagree on how that match is best 
achieved. Empirical studies to date suggest that the direction of causality is idiosyncratic 
to a specific industry, or even a particular time period in an industry (Fixson and Park, 
2008; Sako, 2004). Thus, an important unexplored research topic is to understand the 
contingent factors that influence the extent to which product modularity can reduce the 
need for communication vis-à-vis the difficulty of changing organization structure.  
3. Role of modularity. Another apparent difference is the role of modularity in the 
theoretical narratives of mirroring. Even though modularity has long been considered an 
important software design principle, discussions about mirroring in the software 
engineering literature typically do not make reference to modularity. Instead, mirroring is 
more often stated as an isomorphism between technical and organization structures. 
Similarly, the organizational theory literature does not make reference to modularity to 
describe mirroring. In other words, mirroring is conceptualized in these literatures as 
structural similarity between product and organization, not just simply correlation 
between product and organizational modularity. Accordingly, Colfer and Baldwin (2010) 
specify an ideal test of the mirroring hypothesis in terms of the degree of structural 
61 
 
similarity between product and organization.    
Notably, the ideal test is much stronger than those specifications that 
conceptualize mirroring as correlation between product and organizational modularity. It 
can take into account the possibility that complex systems can be non-uniformly 
modularized26. For instance, if half of a complex system is highly modular but the other 
half remains highly integrated, a scalar modularity metric for the entire system would 
produce a medium value, which would not accurately characterize the true system 
architecture. In comparison, the ideal test does not depend on modularity measurements 
and is therefore less likely to produce false support for the mirroring hypothesis. 
Modularity as a design principle usefully promotes the benefits of systematic 
decomposition. However, as a description of system architecture, modularity strips away 
much of the structural details and should be best understood as a summary description. 
Formulating the mirroring hypothesis as correlation between two summary descriptions is 
therefore several steps removed from the actual mirroring process.  
In sum, extant theories of mirroring are more diverse than commonly recognized 
in the contemporary literature. To make progress toward a more nuanced model of 
mirroring, taken for granted assumptions should be explicitly recognized to underscore 
important distinctions and reveal hidden contingencies.  
Implicit assumptions. Much of the recent work in the modularity literature adopts 
Sanchez and Mahoney’s (1996) emphasis on component interface standardization and 
                                                
26 However, the ideal test is also difficult to implement because of the need to construct matrix 
representations for both product and organization designs. This is why the ideal test is usually 
only feasible in the context of software development, where the software source code provides a 
convenient means to construct the needed matrix.    
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interprets it as synonymous with product modularity (e.g., Argyres and Bigelow, 2010; 
Jacobs et al., 2011; Tiwana, 2008a, 2008b). As a result, interface standardization is often 
predicted to be associated with organizational modularity. However, a growing body of 
research reports that interface standardization does not always eliminate design inter-
dependencies across components (Cabigiosu et al., 2013; Chuma, 2006; Kotabe et al., 
2007; Ro et al., 2008; Staudenmayer et al., 2005; Takeishi, 2002; Tidd, 1995). For 
example, Staudenmayer and co-authors (2005) observe across multiple industries that 
interdependencies continually emerged despite having component interfaces that are 
defined ex-ante. These findings provide the substance to the debate over the empirical 
status of the mirroring hypothesis.  
However, a closer reading of Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) reveals that their 
emphasis on interface standardization is predicated on the presence of advanced 
architectural knowledge about relevant components and their interactions. Similarly, 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) state that design rules become more complete as the properties 
of the system and the modules or the “innate interdependencies” become better 
understood. Subsequent research often overlooks this important premise or erroneously 
assumes the presence of standardized interface indicates the possession of advanced 
architectural knowledge. In addition, it is also implicitly assumed that architectural 
knowledge remains static as encoded in the standardized interface specification.  
I submit that the central message of Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) is the strategic 
importance of advanced architectural knowledge. While they do emphasize how interface 
stability enables parallel component development and hence organizational modularity, 
their theoretical account does not presume the presence of sufficient architectural 
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knowledge. In fact, by emphasizing the importance to acquire advanced architectural 
knowledge, they implicitly recognize its dynamic nature. Despite the presence of 
standardized interfaces, organizations can acquire new understanding of component 
interactions as the underlying technologies evolve. Organizations can even forget existing, 
structurally embedded architectural knowledge as Henderson and Clark (1990) show. 
Therefore, importantly, modularity as observed in design artifacts is only a partial 
indicator of the level of architectural knowledge.  
Simply put, the extant literature on the mirroring hypothesis has come to 
implicitly adopt various assumptions of completeness – organizations adopting modular 
product development are assumed to possess architectural knowledge of all possible 
component interactions, such that the overall system architecture can be completely 
specified a priori. That is, these organizations need to be capable of specifying 
component interfaces that completely partition product systems into stand-alone modules 
that only interact as specified by the standardized interfaces. This architectural 
knowledge is also assumed to be completely embodied in the design artifacts, so that all 
technical interdependencies that would require organizational coordination can be 
observed directly from the artifacts. As I discuss in the following section, these 
assumptions are not always tenable and should be better understood as theoretical ideals. 
The extent to which these assumptions are borne out in practice places boundary 
conditions on the prediction of mirroring.  
 
3.3 Contingent Model of Mirroring 
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Sosa, Eppinger, and Rowles (2004) maintain that although most of the 
architectural knowledge is explicit and known by development organizations, some 
architectural knowledge remains unspecified or unknown until detailed design. Following 
the same logic, I maintain that no product development organization is omniscient with 
regard to component interactions and their implications to system behaviors. Even with 
the best efforts at ex-ante standardization, some component interactions can only be 
identified during the design process itself, or even after the product system is put to use. 
In other words, I take the position that architectural knowledge is inevitably incomplete. 
Because architectural knowledge is always incomplete, it then follows that ex-ante 
standardization alone cannot fully eliminate the need for designers of different 
components to communicate. Importantly, the extent to which ex-ante standardization 
can reduce the need for communication depends on how much an organization knows 
about component interactions when the interface is being standardized. The more 
component interactions an organization is aware of, the more standardized interface can 
partition the product system into stand-alone modules and reduce the need for 
communication. For example, as automotive engineers understand more about how 
specific engine designs interact with the rest of the chassis to produce unwanted vibration, 
the way the engine is mounted can be standardized accordingly so that engine and chassis 
designers no longer have to communicate to reduce vibration. Without the knowledge 
about the interaction, engine and chassis designers still have to resort to joint problem 
solving to reduce vibration even if engine mounting is standardized according to other 
design considerations. Therefore, as a baseline, I propose that mirroring is contingent on 
the level of architectural knowledge. 
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Proposition 1: The extent of mirroring between product and organization 
increases with an increase in the level of architectural knowledge. 
While some research studies take advantage of unique empirical settings to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Hoetker, 2006), which includes heterogeneity 
in architectural knowledge, most studies do not systematically assess this important 
contingent factor. This shortcoming is due in part to the current state of theory 
development that has not explicitly recognized this knowledge contingency, but is also 
due to the difficulty of measuring knowledge assets. Therefore, it might be useful to 
derive propositions with more observable constructs that correlate with an organization’s 
possession of architectural knowledge. 
Learning from experience. The literature on organizational learning considers 
learning from experience an important knowledge acquisition mechanism (Huber, 1991; 
Levitt and March, 1988). In the case of architectural knowledge, experience plays a 
particularly significant role in learning because component interactions that detrimentally 
impact system behavior are often unanticipated. These incidental interactions (Ulrich, 
1994) only manifest themselves when components are physically put together during 
testing or final integration. Direct experience with a product architecture is therefore an 
irreplaceable element in architectural knowledge development. As a product development 
organization accumulates more experience with a particular product architecture it would 
encounter and become aware of more incidental component interactions, which enable 
the organization to achieve a higher level of modularization.  
Furthermore, the likelihood that knowledge about incidental interaction becomes 
organizationally embedded as depicted by Henderson and Clark (1990) increases with the 
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frequency of its occurrence and the severity of the problem it causes, both of which 
require time and experience to become clear. Organizational inertia (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977, 1984) places further delay in the structural embodiment of the newly 
learned architectural knowledge. Mirroring between product and organization therefore 
takes time to realize, as organizations acquire experience with the product architecture 
and restructure themselves accordingly. Thus, I posit that mirroring becomes stronger as 
an organization accumulates more experience with a product architecture.      
Proposition 2: The extent of mirroring between product and organization 
increases with an increase in the organization’s cumulative experience with the 
product architecture. 
 Vicarious learning. In addition to direct experience, organizations can also learn 
vicariously through other organizations’ experience (Czepiel, 1975; Huber, 1991). The 
emergence of an industry dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback 
and Abernathy, 1975) provides an opportunity for this form of learning. Dominant design 
embodies technological features that have won the allegiance of the marketplace and 
become a de facto standard (Suarez, 2004). In particular, dominant design encapsulates 
knowledge of component interactions and how to configure product architecture to better 
serve target user needs. It also signals that the industry has accumulated sufficient 
architectural knowledge for the dominant design to be taken for granted.  
While adopting a dominant design does not imply the adopting organization 
necessarily possesses all of the underpinning architectural knowledge, it does indicate 
leading organizations in the industry have developed architectural knowledge that is 
being vicariously learned. That is, organizations with incomplete knowledge about 
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component interactions can still manage to attain a modular partitioning of their product 
systems by imitating those organizations with more complete architectural knowledge. 
Mirroring is therefore also possible if the requisite architectural knowledge can be 
attained externally.  
 In contrast, organizations that choose to not adopt the industry’s dominant design 
pass up the opportunity to benefit from industry knowledge and must rely on internal 
knowledge development. The ramification of this choice might be more significant than it 
first appears. Dominant design emerges as a synthesis of an industry’s collective 
experience on the dominant architecture. It embodies the collective knowledge of a large 
number of organizations. Moreover, organizations forgoing industry dominant design are 
typically pursuing novel product architectures, of which relatively little is known. Thus, 
they are unlikely to achieve the same level of completeness in their architectural 
knowledge, as compared with those following the industry standard.        
 Furthermore, the adoption of a dominant design takes place as part of the broader 
institutional mimetic process as organizations model themselves on other organizations to 
reduce environmental uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As a result of this 
isomorphic process, organization structures that mirror the dominant design would also 
tend to diffuse among those conforming to institutionalization, strengthening the 
mirroring relationship. Put differently, organizations that depend on vicarious learning to 
acquire architectural knowledge are also likely to imitate other organizational practices. I 
therefore suggest that mirroring is stronger if a product development organization adopts 
the dominant design of the industry.  
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Proposition 3: Mirroring between product and organization is greater when the 
organization adopts the industry dominant design, vis-à-vis those that choose not 
to adopt the industry dominant design. 
 Knowledge obsolescence. While organizations can benefit from industry 
knowledge, they are also confronted with challenges posed by industry dynamics. 
Innovation scholars have long recognized that some types of technological change can be 
competence-destroying and render extant knowledge assets obsolete (Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Architectural knowledge is therefore subject 
to the threat of obsolescence as technologies evolve. In particular, systemic or 
architectural innovations tend to render prior interface standards obsolete, hence reducing 
the completeness of an organization’s architectural knowledge as old knowledge is made 
obsolete and new knowledge is yet to be fully internalized (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Zirpoli and Becker, 2011). In other words, architectural innovations “reset the clock” on 
an organization’s experience with product architecture.  
 This threat of obsolescence is particularly pronounced in industries where 
competition occurs at the architectural level. Organizations in these industries compete by 
searching for novel product architectures that surpass their competitors along some 
performance dimensions. For instance, the semiconductor photolithographic alignment 
equipment industry in Henderson and Clark's (1990) study was shaken by four waves of 
architectural innovation between 1962 and 1986. During this period, the dominant 
architecture of the industry went through four disruptive transitions as new entrants 
successfully dethroned leading incumbents with novel product architectures. In contrast, 
product architecture has remained remarkably stable in the personal computer industry 
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since its inception.      
 Therefore, in industries characterized by rapid architectural innovations, 
architectural knowledge is likely to be persistently incomplete as product development 
organizations engage in continuous explorations for novel architectures. In contrast, in 
industries with stable dominant architectures, architectural knowledge can be developed 
cumulatively toward increasing completeness. Moreover, as Henderson and Clark's (1990) 
study illustrates, architectural knowledge that has become structurally embedded 
significantly constrains an organization’s ability to sense and respond to competitors’ 
architectural innovations. Accordingly, strong mirroring can be a dangerous practice 
when architectural innovations are expected to happen frequently. 
 Organizations in industries with stable product architectures can accumulate more 
complete and nuanced knowledge about component interactions. They are also in a better 
position to take advantage of mirroring since the threat of knowledge embeddedness can 
be more easily mitigated when the underpinning technologies evolve in more predictable 
ways. Thus, I predict that mirroring would be stronger when the dominant product 
architecture remains stable.     
Proposition 4: The extent of mirroring between product and organization 
increases with an increase in the stability of the dominant product architecture in 
the industry.  
In addition to architectural innovations, technological changes at the component 
level also contribute to the obsolescence of architectural knowledge. This connection has 
not received full attention because much of the management literature on modularity 
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adopts Henderson and Clark's (1990) conception of modular innovation as innovation 
that changes the core component design concepts without changing the product 
architecture. Their conception has since been interpreted to imply a dichotomous 
conceptual separation of architectural and component innovations, which overlooks their 
interconnectedness.  
In contrast, scholars from the systems integration literature (e.g., Brusoni et al., 
2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001a, 2001b) subscribe to Rosenberg’s (1976) idea that 
different modules in a multicomponent product system might change at different rates, 
thus creating a “technical imbalance” that focuses the innovative efforts of an 
organization. Particularly, this unevenness in technological progress across modules 
opens up opportunities for architectural innovations. 
In fact, Henderson and Clark themselves have stated that “architectural innovation 
is often triggered by a change in a component” (1990: 12), and cite as example the jet 
aircraft industry, in which the introduction of jet engine technology provided a dis-
continuous performance improvement that changed the interactions between the engine 
and the rest of the plane in complex and subtle ways (Gardiner, 1986; Miller and Sawyers, 
1968). Henderson and Clark (1990) suggest that failure of the incumbent firms to 
introduce new aircraft architecture accordingly was one factor that led to Boeing’s rise to 
dominance. As their example illustrates, technological change at the component level can 
alter existing component interactions and generate new component interactions 
sufficiently significant to render extant architectural knowledge obsolete. In other words, 
component innovation can be the antecedent to architectural innovations.  
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One way to further clarify this connection is to revisit Henderson and Clark's 
(1990) seminal typology of technological change. Their typology classifies innovations 
along two dimensions: one captures whether an innovation reinforces or overturns the 
core component design concepts; the other captures whether an innovation maintains or 
changes the linkages between components. According to this classification, innovations 
can be incremental, modular, architectural, or radical (see Figure 3.1.a). What has 
become obscured in the subsequent literature is that in this typology, both incremental 
and modular innovations involve changes at the component level; and both architectural 
and radical innovations involve changes at the architectural level27. Moreover, the two 
dimensions are not meant to be symmetrical as they are often misinterpreted to be (see 
Figure 3.1.b). Whereas the horizontal dimension captures the extent of an innovation’s 
impact on component, the vertical dimension captures whether or not an innovation 
impacts extant product architecture at all. This asymmetry is intended to highlight their 
core message – seemingly subtle reconfigurations of existing component technologies, 
i.e., architectural innovations, can pose significant challenge to incumbents.  
My purpose here is to explore the connection between component and 
architectural innovations. Thus, I suggest that Henderson and Clark’s (1990) incremental 
and modular innovations can be usefully relabeled “incremental component innovation” 
and “radical component innovation” to emphasize that they are both changes at the 
component level but differ in the extent of their impacts. This relabeling places 
component innovations along a continuum and allows us to assess how they trigger 
architectural innovation.  
                                                
27 Note that Henderson and Clark (1990) define radical innovations as ones that involve change 
at both the component and architectural levels.  
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By definition, component innovations do not impact existing product architecture. 
In theory, one can simply replace the old component with the innovation and the overall 
product system should continue to work. However, component innovation could interact 
with other components in ways that leave extant architecture usable but suboptimal. For 
example, a jet engine can be used, in theory, with an airframe designed to work with a 
propeller engine. However, the much greater output of the jet engine easily exceeds the 
specifications the propeller airframe was designed to handle. Early jet aircraft designers 
struggled with serious vibration and metal fatigue problems and only managed to 
overcome these problems with new airframe architectures and newly developed 
aluminum alloys (Bright, 1978). Otherwise, aircraft designers would have needed to 
throttle back jet engines considerably to be used with existing airframes. In other words, 
component innovations present product designers with the dilemma of choosing between 
disrupting system architecture and passing up the performance advantage the component 
innovations create.    
Radical component innovations overturn the core design concepts of the affected 
components. They are therefore more likely to create greater technical imbalance among 
components than incremental component innovations, and render more extant 
architectural knowledge obsolete. Consequently, following radical component 
innovations, the extent of mirroring between product and organization would likely 
decrease as product development organizations seek more suitable architectures to take 
full advantage of the innovations. It is anticipated that the more radical the component 
innovation, the greater the reduction in mirroring.              
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Proposition 5: The extent of mirroring between product and organization is 
negatively correlated with the extent of component innovation, i.e., radical 
component innovations would trigger more reduction in mirroring than 
incremental component innovations.   
 In summary, I maintain that the implicit assumption of complete architectural 
knowledge is untenable in most scenarios and should be best understood as a theoretical 
ideal. Mirroring between product and organization is contingent on the organization’s 
architectural knowledge about component interactions – organizations must be aware of 
component interactions before they can contain interactions through interface 
standardization. This knowledge prerequisite can be met either through internal 
knowledge development or through external knowledge access28. Mirroring is therefore 
stronger as a product development organization accumulates more experience with the 
product architecture or imitates the industry’s dominant design. Moreover, architectural 
knowledge is subject to the threat of obsolescence. Architectural innovations can be 
planned in a top-down manner; they can also emerge from the bottom up as 
advancements in component technologies create opportunities to re-imagine better 
system architectures. Therefore, both architectural and component innovations render 
part of the extant architectural knowledge obsolete and thereby reduce the extent of 
mirroring. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
                                                
28 My discussion here focuses on meeting the knowledge prerequisite that brings about mirroring. 
I do not intend to suggest that internal knowledge development and external knowledge access 
are perfect substitutes for architectural knowledge acquisition. The choice has obvious 
competitive implications. 
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 Garud, Jain, and Tuertscher comment that the traditional discourse on design 
extols the virtues of completeness: "[c]ompleteness allows for the pre-specification of a 
problem, the identification of pre-existing alternatives and the choice of the most optimal 
solution" (2008: 351). This traditional approach to design follows the logic of constrained 
optimization (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) and pervades much of management thinking, 
education, and research (Romme, 2003). However, in environments characterized by 
changes, an emphasis on completeness leads to designs that foreclose future options 
(Barry and Rerup, 2006; Garud et al., 2008).  
 This insight reveals a contradiction hidden in the extant modularity literature. On 
the one hand, modularity scholars attribute the organizational benefits of modularity to 
the information stability provided by the complete specification of component interface, 
i.e., completeness in architectural design creates the organizational benefits of modularity 
(e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). On the other hand, these 
scholars also promote modularity as an option-creating design approach that helps meet 
the increasing demand for flexibility, variety, and extensibility (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 
1997, 2000; Langlois and Robertson, 1992), i.e., an important objective of modularity is 
the ability to adapt to future changes.  
 Importantly, these seemingly contradictory characterizations reflect an inherent 
tension in modularity as a design approach. Whereas design completeness at the 
architectural level is the enabling virtue, modular design at the component level is 
intended to be open-ended, though bounded by the standardized component interface. 
Therefore, the unspoken rationale of modular design is that component flexibility is 
attained through the acceptance of architectural rigidity as a trade-off. Consistent with 
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Farjoun's (2010) assertion that stability can enable change and adaptability, it is the 
commitment to a rigid architectural design, i.e., the standardized component interface, 
that enables the flexibility and autonomy of component design. Thus, modular design can 
be understood as an instance of the dual search for stability and change that pervades all 
forms of organizing (Weick, 1979: 136).  
 Recognizing this duality helps us gain a more nuanced understanding of modular 
design. While the extant literature emphasizes completeness in architectural design, when 
a modular system is considered across all levels (i.e., not just at the architectural level), 
modularity as a design approach actually harnesses what Garud et al. call "the generative 
forces of incompleteness" (2008: 356). This claim can be stated in terms that are more 
familiar to the extant literature: modularity entails the partition of design parameters into 
visible information about component interface and hidden information that only affects 
the functioning of the local modules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000); the hidden information 
is in effect an incomplete specification of design parameters from the perspective of the 
system as a whole, since component designers have the autonomy to change these 
parameters unilaterally without causing cascading changes throughout the system. Put 
simply, the essence of modular design is the creation of a hierarchy that paradoxically 
allows the co-existence of two opposing design logics. Modular design is intended to be 
simultaneously complete and incomplete,29 so that it can be continually evolving in an 
organized fashion.  
                                                
29 This interpretation of modularity is consistent with Orton and Weick's (1990) dialectic 
interpretation of loose coupling as the juxtaposition of responsiveness and distinctiveness within 
the same system.  
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 Accordingly, the contingent model of mirroring put forth above incorporates this 
nuanced understanding of modular design through the explicit recognition of incomplete 
architectural knowledge; namely, mirroring between product and organization is 
contingent on the level of architectural knowledge about component interactions. This 
knowledge management perspective recasts the current deterministic model of mirroring 
in terms of the inherent tension in modular design. The resulting contingent dynamics 
shed light on a fundamental trade-off product development organizations face when they 
encounter and learn new architectural knowledge about component interactions- Do they 
preserve the extant architecture and the established correspondence between product and 
organization so the benefits of interface stability can be sustained? Or do they disrupt 
extant architecture and the established correspondence between product and organization 
so that the full potential of the newly acquired architectural knowledge can be unleashed? 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, I submit that the target demand characteristics 
inform the organizations on how to make this trade-off, which in turns steers product and 
organization toward or away from stronger mirroring.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 This essay contributes to the literature on the mirroring hypothesis by advancing a 
contingent model of mirroring that explicitly recognizes the important role of 
architectural knowledge. The proposed contingent model offers a way to bridge the gap 
between the mainstream narratives of mirroring and the emerging revisionist perspective. 
Specifically, the focus on how architectural knowledge is acquired and managed helps 
77 
 
reconcile the mainstream literature with the systems integration literature, which 
maintains that no one-to-one mapping exists between product architecture and 
organizational architecture (e.g., Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001a, 
2001b). The proposed contingent model points to the changing level of architectural 
knowledge as the underpinning technologies evolve to help explain and predict when the 
mirroring relationship will hold and when it will not. Furthermore, the contingent role of 
demand characteristics also explains the contradictory findings against the mirroring 
hypothesis in the systems integration literature, since many of these studies take place in 
empirical contexts where system failures would result in catastrophic economic loss, e.g., 
aircraft engine (Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001a), and chemical 
engineering industries (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001a).  
 Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) famously suggest that although organizations 
ostensibly design products, it can also be argued that products design organizations. 
Instead, this essay takes the position that people with knowledge design both products 
and organizations. Modular design's duality of architectural rigidity and component 
flexibility requires thoughtful consideration to maintain. Mirroring between product and 
organization is therefore a transient state that reflects the combined effect of the 
underpinning dynamics as product designers and organization managers strive to 
maintain the organizational and product hierarchies that reconcile the opposing needs of 
stability and change. The proposed contingent model puts forth the first step toward 
revealing the underpinning mirroring dynamics and helps build a deeper understanding of 
how organizations manage the knowledge associated with the architecture of the products 
they design. Understanding how organizations manage this higher-order knowledge and 
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how it impacts product and organization design offers important insights on how complex 
innovations are organized.  
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CHAPTER 4 
BREAKING MIRROR FOR THE CUSTOMERS – AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON 
THE DEMAND-SIDE CONTINGENCIES OF THE MIRRORING HYPOTHESIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The mirroring hypothesis posits that a correspondence exists between product and 
organizational architectures. However, as the review in chapter 2 shows, extant theories 
of mirroring actually encompass a multitude of distinct causal mechanisms, suggesting 
that the predicted correspondence might be the combined effect of multiple interacting 
forces with potential contingencies. Accordingly, I develop in chapter 3 a contingent 
model of mirroring at the within-firm level by systematically unpacking the implicit but 
untenable assumption of completeness in architectural knowledge. The proposed model 
explicitly recognizes the contingent role of architectural knowledge and offers a way to 
reconcile the mainstream narratives of mirroring and the emerging revisionist perspective 
(e.g., Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001a, 2001b) that challenges the 
mainstream predictions of mirroring. However, one limitation of the proposed contingent 
model, as well as the extant theories on mirroring, is that much of the discussion focuses 
only on supply-side issues, e.g., product design, firm’s possession or access to 
architectural knowledge, and organizational design. Whether demand-side issues have an 
impact on mirroring remains unexplored.  
In the broader strategic management literature, a growing number of scholars 
have been calling for more research attention on how demand heterogeneity contributes 
to firm heterogeneity (e.g., Adner, 2002, 2004; Adner and Levinthal, 2001; Adner and 
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Snow, 2010; Priem, 2007). In particular, Priem et al. (2012) maintain that strategy 
researchers have not given sufficient attention to demand-side issues. In practice, 
managers certainly need to take demand-side issues into consideration in order to 
formulate effective strategies for their organizations. Thus, we may be missing 
opportunities for new management knowledge that come from the demand-side.  
This empirical study continues to explore contingencies on the mirroring 
relationship between product and organization. Following the call for more attention on 
demand-side issues, I develop a model of mirroring that is contingent on the demand 
characteristics of a firm’s target customers. Specifically, I examine mirroring in the 
context of systems integration firms that have adopted industry standard modular 
architecture. Given the same product architecture and underpinning technologies, extant 
theories of mirroring would predict similar organizational architectures among these 
firms. Instead, I predict that the extent of mirroring would be reduced for firms targeting 
customers with high demands for system performance, as well as firms targeting 
customers who would suffer great economic loss in the event of system failures, i.e., 
customers with high demands for system reliability. I test these hypotheses with a 
distinctive empirical setting that allows variance in demand characteristics while still 
holding product architecture constant. Thus, the observed variance in organizational 
modularity can be attributed to the contingent role of demand characteristics. The 
empirical results lend support for the hypothesized demand-side contingencies, and also 
point to the need for more careful theoretical and empirical investigation to untangle the 
impacts of different demand characteristics on the mirroring relationship. The findings 
contribute to the growing empirical evidence of contingencies on mirroring (e.g., 
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Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Cabigiosu et al., 2013; Furlan et al., 2014) and to the 
debate on the organizational implications of modularity.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section develops the theory on how 
demand characteristics impact mirroring between product and organization. I then discuss 
the empirical challenges to test this theory and how my research design overcomes these 
challenges. Next, I present my empirical method. After a discussion of the results, a final 
section concludes with implications and limitations.   
 
4.2 Theory Development 
The mainstream narratives of mirroring express a deterministic view linking the 
engineering structure of a product with the related organizational structure (Cabigiosu et 
al., 2013). On the contrary, the revisionist literature (Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2001a; Cabigiosu et al., 2013; Takeishi, 2001; Zirpoli and Camuffo, 2009) 
maintains that firms’ knowledge boundaries extend beyond firms’ task boundaries and 
hence there is no one-to-one mapping between product architecture and organizational 
architecture (Brusoni et al., 2001). At the heart of this debate is whether firms need to 
know more than what they actually make in order to leverage external sources of 
innovation (Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2001) or they can rely on standardized 
component interface to achieve coordination without component-specific knowledge 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Essentially, much of this 
debate is about the extent to which product modularity can reduce the amount of 
component-specific knowledge needed to perform systems integration.  
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I submit that the amount of component-specific knowledge needed to perform 
systems integration depends on the specific demand characteristics of the target 
customers. Therefore, different demand characteristics can be the important 
contingencies that help reconcile this long-standing debate. Specifically, I will show that 
target customers’ demands for system performance and system reliability influence the 
amount of component-specific knowledge needed to perform systems integration. To 
substantiate this claim, I need to first make clear the distinction between system fine-
tuning and interdependent component development30. 
System fine-tuning vs. component development. The review in chapter 2 
identified an alternative interpretation of modularity that reveals an important but not 
well known distinction. Specifically, Fujimoto (2001) and Chuma (2006) contend that the 
defining characteristic of a non-modular product architecture is the need to perform post-
assembly system fine-tuning because fine-tuning entails mutual adjustments of 
component configurations, which requires some component-specific knowledge. 
Accordingly, the defining characteristic of a modular product architecture is that the 
overall system performance can be automatically guaranteed if the specified performance 
of the constituent components is assured ex ante (Chuma, 2006). In other words, modular 
components are supposed to just “plug and play.” This interpretation is a significant 
departure from mainstream interpretations of product modularity. It explicitly assumes 
the perspective of systems integrators and conceptualizes product modularity as the 
extent to which a component can be treated as a “black box” in the context of systems 
                                                
30 In Sanchez and Mahoney’s (1996) terms, interdependent component development includes 
sequential product development and overlapping problem solving, both of which require heavy 
information flows between component development processes.   
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integration - the more modular a component, the less component-specific knowledge is 
required of the systems integrator to use such a component.  
The distinction between system fine-tuning and interdependent component 
development is subtle but critical to my purpose here. Even though they are both 
instances of mutual adjustments across components (i.e., instances of reciprocal 
interdependencies across components), system fine-tuning does not change the designs of 
the components; more importantly, system fine-tuning does not change the standardized 
component interface, thus preserving the loosely coupled coordination among component 
developers. Fine-tuning only changes the configurations of the components within the 
range of component variation permitted by the standardized interface. For example, fine-
tuning a computer system to serve a busy website might involve mutual adjustments of 
the networking module of the operating system and the database system that stores the 
content of the website; however, fine-tuning does not involve a redesign of either the 
network module or the database system. In other words, fine-tuning occurs during 
systems integration, at which point component development has already concluded. 
Therefore, system fine-tuning is an instance of ex post reciprocal interdependencies 
across components, whereas interdependent component development (i.e., non-modular 
component development) is an instance of ex ante reciprocal interdependencies.  
Importantly, whereas component interface standardization reduces reciprocal 
interdependencies during component development, it does not necessarily reduce the 
need for post-assembly system fine-tuning. In fact, interface standards often parameterize 
aspects of component design in order to leave room for post-assembly fine-tuning. This 
practice allows systems design flexibility and component reusability toward future use 
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cases that had not been conceived when component interface was standardized.  
It follows from this distinction that systems integrators can fine-tune their product 
systems to have different qualities, even if they use the same components and implement 
identical interface standard. It also follows that contrary to Sanchez and Mahoney's 
(1996) claim, ex ante standardization of component interface does not always completely 
decouple component knowledge and architectural knowledge, if post-assembly system 
fine-tuning, and hence some component knowledge, is still required to ensure the 
integrated systems perform as intended.  
Moreover, making clear this distinction helps us reach the counter-intuitive 
conclusion that even for the same product system, product modularity as experienced by 
component developers (i.e., interdependencies across components during component 
development) and product modularity as experienced by systems integrators (i.e., 
interdependencies across components during systems integration) need not be the same. 
This distinction thus provides a way to reconcile the mainstream narratives of mirroring 
and the revisionist challenge: advocates of modularity are right in that product modularity 
enables loosely-coupled coordination among component developers due to the embedded 
coordination of the interface standard (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), i.e., product 
modularity reduces ex ante reciprocal interdependencies; revisionists are also right in that 
product modularity does not always reduce reciprocal interdependencies during systems 
integration, i.e., product modularity does not always reduce ex post reciprocal 
interdependencies, which is consistent with their observations that integrators that have 
outsourced component production or even component design often still possess deep 
component-specific knowledge (Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2001). Thus, using 
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standard modular components to build integrated systems is not always a simple matter 
of "plug and play." The contingent factor that influences the amount of component-
specific knowledge needed during systems integration is therefore the focus of my 
following discussion. 
Demand-side contingencies. In order to promote adoption, industry standard 
components are usually designed with the typical customer requirements in mind. For 
those systems integrators targeting customers with high performance demands, extant 
literature suggests that there are two ways to meet the stricter requirements.  
First, they can identify the components that are critical to overall product 
performance and select the best performing components from the market. That is, 
systems integrators can take advantage of the increased rate of innovation enabled by the 
widespread adoption of modular designs (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). In this case, overall 
product performance is improved through modular innovations in performance-critical 
components. Much of the history of the personal computer industry can be characterized 
by this type of performance improvement. The second approach embraces the power of 
integrality (Fixson and Park, 2008) or synergistic specificity (Schilling, 2000), which 
achieves greater system performance by adopting a more integrated architecture. For 
example, Fixson and Park's (2008) historical case study on the bicycle drivetrain industry 
shows how a firm turned its formerly competitive industry into a near-monopoly through 
decreasing its product modularity. However, this approach requires a transition to a new 
product architecture, which is a fundamental change that breaks down established 
interface standards (Chesbrough, 2003). Overall product performance is improved 
through architectural innovation, often quite significantly; however, this approach 
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requires heavy investment to establish new industry standards.  
The earlier discussion on system fine-tuning points to a third approach that is 
commonly used but has not received much attention in the research literature. Namely, 
systems integrators can continue to use current interface standard, but improve system 
performance through system fine-tuning. This approach combines the advantages of the 
first two approaches. It does not break down established interface standards so systems 
integrators can continue to take advantage of the benefits of using established standards. 
At the same time, it allows integrators to achieve a tighter integration to improve system 
performance. Performance gains from fine-tuning (as well as modular innovations) 
eventually approach the limit of the current architecture (Ernst, 2005), at which point it 
becomes necessary to establish a new architecture in order to improve system 
performance further. However, for firms competing in the high performance market tier, 
being able to squeeze as much of the theoretical performance as possible out of the 
current interface standard through system fine-tuning provides an important competitive 
advantage.  
Since system fine-tuning requires some component-specific knowledge to 
perform mutual adjustments of component configurations, systems integrators targeting 
customers with high performance demands need to retain more component-specific 
knowledge than predicted by the extant mirroring theories. Moreover, these systems 
integrators also need to track advancements in component technologies, which can create 
opportunities emerging from the bottom up to better fine-tune the overall system. In 
addition, these systems integrators also benefit from greater ability to recognize and react 
to architectural innovations, which means that they should avoid turning architectural 
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knowledge inert by embedding it in organizational routines and information channels 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). That is, systems integrators aspiring to compete in the high 
performance market tier should avoid strongly mirroring product architecture so they do 
not fall into the so-called “modularity trap” (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001). This line 
of reasoning is also consistent with Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) warning against 
outsourcing core competencies and Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) advice to invest in 
absorptive capacity.  
Taken together, whether systems integrators targeting high performance market 
tier choose to optimize performance within current interface standards through fine-
tuning or disrupt current interface standards with architectural innovations, their 
organizational structure needs to remain relatively integrated to meet the additional 
knowledge requirements. Therefore, I propose: 
Proposition 1: The extent of mirroring between product and organization is 
reduced for systems integration firms targeting customers with high performance 
demands.  
In addition to performance, reliability is another demand characteristic that could 
impact the extent of mirroring. As I assert in chapter 3, architectural knowledge is 
inevitably incomplete, which results in incidental component interactions (Ulrich, 1994). 
Incidental interactions are those insidious interactions across components that remain 
unknown or unnoticed for much (or even all) of the product development process (Sosa et 
al., 2004). Incidental component interactions often manifest themselves as system 
reliability issues. These “glitches” (Hoopes and Postrel, 1999) can range from minor 
annoyances (e.g., a personal computer crash) to catastrophic system failures (e.g., a plane 
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crash). Even for the same product system, system failures can cause drastically different 
economic losses, depending on the specific use case. A computer system intended for 
personal gaming and a computer system intended to control radiation therapy equipment 
would have very different reliability requirements, even if these systems are built on 
identical component technologies and architecture.  
Customers who suffer high economic losses in the event of system failures would 
pay a premium for products that are highly reliable. In order to cater to these customers, 
systems integrators need to organize themselves to discover and contain as many 
incidental component interactions as possible. Adhering to interface standards alone is 
insufficient to achieve a high level of reliability, because unlike functionality, system 
reliability is not easily decomposable into stand-alone components (Zirpoli and Becker, 
2011). One reason for the incomplete decomposability is that multiple, interdependent 
functional dimensions (e.g., speed, noise, vibration, energy consumption, etc.) compose 
the overall system characteristics. More fundamentally, system reliability is not easily 
decomposable because it essentially is the outcome of a mitigation strategy against 
unforeseen circumstances. Thus, ex ante knowledge about component interactions (i.e., 
prior architectural knowledge) cannot fully substitute organizational integration to 
mitigate incidental interactions. Therefore, I propose:  
Proposition 2: The extent of mirroring between product and organization is 
reduced for systems integration firms targeting customers with high reliability 
demands.  
 
4.3 Empirical Challenge and Solution 
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Understanding complex phenomena requires that we hold some units of 
observation constant. Hoetker (2006) comments that it has been difficult to empirically 
test the mirroring hypothesis because we rarely observe design processes that differ in 
their degree of product and organizational modularity, but not along other dimensions. To 
address this challenge, Hoetker (2006) used a unique empirical setting to control for 
confounding factors present in previous studies. Subsequent research have similarly used 
unique empirical settings to test the mirroring relationship (e.g., Argyres and Bigelow, 
2010; Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Furlan et al., 2014; MacCormack et al., 2012).  
The model of mirroring with demand-side contingencies presents an additional 
challenge. To empirically test demand contingencies, we not only need to control for 
confounding factors, but at the same time, allow variance in demand conditions. To 
address this challenge, I observe the organizational design choices of computer systems 
integration firms using the industry standard Intel x86 computer architecture, effectively 
holding product architecture constant in terms of software and hardware compatibility. 
Importantly, Intel x86 architecture is not synonymous with IBM PC compatible, since 
x86 computer architecture is also widely used in a large variety of computer systems 
beyond personal computing. Thus, this empirical context allows the needed variance in 
demand characteristics. In addition, the long-time market dominance of x86 architecture 
results in the proliferation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components for all the 
components needed to build a functioning computer system. Even for more specialized 
use cases (e.g., avionics systems, defense systems, and telecommunication devices), 
systems integrators still have COTS components readily available from the market 
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place31.   
Consequently, systems integrators adopting x86 architecture can easily mix and 
match modular components from a wide variety of readily available COTS components 
to build computer systems that serve different use cases. This combinative flexibility is 
one of the key benefits suggested by the proponents of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 
1997; Schilling, 2000). Furthermore, the proliferation of COTS components also means 
that systems integration firms do not need to possess component development capabilities 
to build functioning computer systems. In fact, building x86 compatible computer 
systems has become so accessible, even people without much technical knowledge and 
resources can manage to do so easily. The vibrant DIY PC building community is a 
testament to the widespread access to this standard architecture. This high degree of 
vertical specialization is consistent with the prediction of the mirroring hypothesis 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Therefore, in this empirical 
context, decisions to not use readily available COTS components can be interpreted as a 
move away from spot markets towards integration, which are therefore cases of reduced 
mirroring, or deviation from the prediction of mirroring. Accordingly, two hypotheses 
can be derived in this empirical context to test the contingent model presented earlier: 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in target customers’ performance demand increases a 
systems integration firm’s likelihood of deviating from using COTS components.  
Hypothesis 2: An increase in target customers’ reliability demand increases a 
systems integration firm’s likelihood of deviating from using COTS components. 
                                                
31 This claim is verified by interviews with practitioners in the industrial computer manufacturing 
segment. Interviewees reported that almost all components they chose to develop internally have 
COTS counterparts available. These practitioners also provided catalogs for specialized COTS 
components.   
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4.4 Data and Method 
 To test these hypotheses, I carried out a cross-sectional quantitative study of 
computer systems integrators’ decisions to deviate from using readily available COTS 
components, which indicate reduced mirroring. Interviews at three computer systems 
integrators32 in the Silicon Valley supplemented the quantitative study.  
Sample. The proliferation of x86 computer architecture into a large variety of 
industries presents a challenge for data collection. No single directory lists all systems 
integration firms adopting the x86 standard because these firms operate in different 
industries. To construct the sample of qualified systems integrators, I identified the SIC 
codes for 7 example firms that use x86 standard to implement computer systems in a 
variety of industries (personal computer, high performance engineering workstation, 
server computer, industrial computer, defense system, telecommunication device, and 
security device). With the 5 SIC codes identified for the 7 example firms, I used 
Hoover’s Industry Directory to identify 14,214 firms in the 6 largest U.S. high-tech 
clusters according to reports33 from the Milken Institute and Brookings Institute. These 6 
                                                
32 The three systems integrators interviewed were selected from different industry segments. One 
systems integrator produces industrial computer systems for a variety of specialized use cases in 
industrial or otherwise harsh environments. The second systems integrator produces Linux-based 
computer server and workstation for high performance computing. The third systems integrator 
specializes in servers and desktop computers for business applications. All of these firms produce 
systems fully compatible with the Intel x86 standard.  
 
33 The two reports referenced are North America’s High-Tech Economy: The Geography of 
Knowledge-Based Industries by the Milken Institute and High Tech Specialization: A 
Comparison of High Technology Centers by the Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy at the 
Brookings Institute.  
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clusters account for 16.4% of North American employment and 25.4% of North 
American wages in high-tech manufacturing and services industries34. I then screened 
these firms to identify systems integrators that meet the following conditions:  
(1.) The company builds fully integrated computer systems; firms that only build 
partially assembled systems (known as “barebone” systems) that require further 
integration were excluded. This condition ensures that the included firm is 
directly responsible to the customers for the overall system performance and 
reliability;  
(2.) The computer systems produced are fully compatible with Intel x86 
architecture. This condition ensures that firms in the sample do have the choice 
between readily available x86-compatible COTS components vs. internal 
development or other sources of custom-design components.  
This screening process identified the sample of 177 strategic business units (out of 
173 firms) that sell fully integrated computer systems based on Intel x86 compatible 
architecture.   
Dependent variable. A computer system can be conceptualized as a three-layer 
stack. At the bottom is the hardware layer, which consists of various semiconductor chips 
integrated on a printed circuit board called the “motherboard.” At the middle is the 
system software layer, which includes the operating system (e.g., Microsoft Windows, 
Linux) and various hardware component controlling programs called “drivers.” Hardware 
component firms develop these drivers in accordance with predefined interface standards 
so that their components can be compatible with the rest of the computer system. At the 
top is the application software layer, which includes packaged software programs (e.g., 
                                                
34 According to the report by the Milken Institute.  
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Microsoft Office, Internet browsers) that interact directly with the users. Packaged 
software programs usually require an operating system to function. They are developed in 
accordance with the operating system’s application programming interface (API), which 
ensures compatibility with the computer system.  
Since x86 architecture is highly modular and standardized, and COTS 
components are readily available for all kinds of use cases, systems integrators in theory 
do not need to possess the capabilities to develop or modify any component across these 
three layers. Compatible hardware and software components from the spot markets are all 
supposed to “plug and play.” Thus, an observation of internal development or 
modification activities in any of the three layers by a systems integrator indicates a 
deviation from perfect mirroring.  
Along with two industry experts, I collected data for this variable by reviewing 
the company’s product catalogs. Since systems integrators have an incentive to advertise 
their differentiating capabilities, it was easy to observe instances of deviation. We 
contacted those companies that did not provide sufficient information in their product 
catalogs to determine the value of this variable. The indicator variable DEVIATION is 
set to 1 if a systems integrator is observed to engage in component development or 
modification activities in any of the three layers. For example, if a systems integrator 
develops its own driver program for a hardware component instead of using the generic 
driver program provided by the component vendor, the indicator variable DEVIATION is 
set to 1; or if a systems integrator works with packaged software vendor to optimize or 
certify otherwise compatible packaged software, the indicator variable DEVIATION is 
also set to 1. Since the value of this variable is based on objective observation, the three 
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coders achieved high agreement in the initial coding (agreement for 163 of the 177 
strategic business units, or 92.09% agreement). We resolved the cases of disagreement 
after discussion.  
Independent variables. To measure the performance and reliability demands of 
the focal firm’s target customers, the two industry experts and I rated the company’s 
product catalogs, websites, or any other available marketing materials we could obtain. 
We developed and pretested the initial coding procedures with 20 firms excluded from 
the final sample due to their adoption of non-x86 computer architectures, but otherwise 
compete in similar market segments as the included firms. However, it was determined 
that the two constructs (i.e., target customers’ performance and reliability demand) were 
initially operationalized in a manner that lacks distinctiveness. Coders often confused the 
two constructs. For example, in many cases if a computer system performs too poorly, 
the resulting low performance could result in severe economic loss to the customer in a 
manner similar to system crashes, i.e., insufficient performance can result in the same 
devastating economic loss as total loss of performance in demanding use cases. In these 
use cases, the coders tended to code it as both high performance demand and high 
reliability demand. 
In order to improve distinctiveness, the two constructs were subsequently recoded 
with new operationalizations. In particular, reliability demand was operationalized 
strictly in terms of unexpected failure to meet design specifications. Insufficient 
computing power, so long as it is not a result of unexpected failure to meet design 
specifications, is therefore made conceptually distinct from insufficient reliability. The 
new operationalizations were tested with another 20 firms not included in the final 
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sample. The coders discussed discrepancies in the coding and refined the coding protocol 
accordingly.    
To assess intercoder reliability with 3 coders and interval scale, the appropriate 
measure is Krippendorff’s alpha (Krippendorff, 2004). For target customers’ performance 
demand, the Krippendorff’s alpha among the 3 coders is 0.763; for target customers’ 
reliability demand, the Krippendorff’s alpha among the three coders is 0.842. These 
reliability measures are above the common threshold of 0.7 in content analysis research 
(Krippendorff, 2004). The independent variable PERFORMANCE is set to the average 
value of the three expert codings. Similarly, the independent variable RELIABILITY is 
set to the average of the three expert codings.         
Control variables. While the objective of this study is to assess the influence of 
demand characteristics on a firm’s decision to forgo using COTS components, other 
factors may influence this decision as well. For instance, production volume can 
influence the likelihood of deviating from using COTS components due to its impact on 
the overall cost structure. There are fixed costs associated with product development. 
Firms that choose to forgo using readily available COTS components have to bear these 
fixed costs. Therefore, there needs to be sufficient volume for internal component 
development to be an economically viable option. In addition, firms with high production 
volume can potentially achieve significant savings if the components are custom 
designed to reduce the cost of production by eliminating some unwanted features from 
industry standard components. At large volume, even a slight decrease in component cost 
can easily outweigh the fixed costs of custom design and even result in additional profits. 
Thus, production volume of the integrated systems is included as a control variable to 
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ensure that the observed relationships between the dependent variable and the theoretical 
variables are not influenced by it.  
Exact production volume is difficult to measure consistently across all the 
systems integration firms in the sample. Market research firms like International Data 
Corporation and Gartner provide unit sales estimates for the large PC vendors; however, 
for systems integrators in specialized categories, such information is difficult to obtain. 
Therefore, I used number of employees found in Hoover’s Industry Directory as a proxy 
to a firm’s production volume. Since the distribution for number of employees in my 
sample is highly skewed, I used natural log of the number of employees as the measure of 
production volume for this research. 
In addition, if a systems integration firm also has business selling internally 
developed components (not just retailing components) to other systems integrators, this 
firm is likely to prefer the components developed internally over other COTS 
components regardless of demand characteristics. Participation in the component 
business also indicates the firm possesses component development capability 
independent of their systems integration business. Since capabilities influence firms’ 
vertical boundary choices (Leiblein and Miller, 2003), participation in the component 
business should be controlled as well.  
 Moreover, there are reasons to believe that firms selling integrated computer 
systems to military and other government agencies might organize their component 
development differently due to the certification requirements in accordance with relevant 
military standards and specifications. I therefore also controlled for firms that have 
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obtained certifications for military standards.  
Table 4.1 lists all the variables and their operationalization. Correlations and 
descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models are presented in Table 4.2. 
 Model specification. I employed a binary choice logit model to assess the 
relationship between a set of covariates and whether or not a systems integration firm 
deviates from using COTS components. Specifically, the binary choice model assumes a 
firm’s decision to deviate is determined by an unobservable, latent variable explained by 
several regressors. The observation of a firm’s deviation decision is therefore assumed to 
indicate whether the value of the latent variable exceeds a threshold value. This model 
specification produces the following multivariate statistical model:  
DEVIATION = β0 + β1-3 Controls + β4 PERFORMANCE + β5 RELIABILITY + ε 
 
4.5 Results  
Table 4.3 summarizes the coefficient estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for 
the 4 logit models used to test the hypotheses. These models estimate the effects of the 
covariates on the probability that a systems integration firm will deviate from using 
readily available COTS components. Since this industry is well known for its high level 
of product modularity and a large variety of COTS components are available for all the 
needed system components, deviation from using COTS components can be interpreted 
as deviation from perfect mirroring between product and organization. Thus, a positive 
coefficient indicates the variable is positively related to the probability of deviation from 
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perfect mirroring. 
Model 1 is the baseline model with only the control variables included. Only 
PRODUCTION VOLUME is statistically significant. The coefficient estimate is positive 
as expected. Model 2 and Model 3 introduce the independent variables PERFORMANCE 
and RELIABILITY respectively. The coefficients are all highly significant and are all 
positive as predicted. Model 4 introduces all independent and control variables. The 
coefficients for all the independent variables are statistically significant and are all 
positive as predicted as well. The results from these models provide strong support for 
the two hypotheses. 
To determine the net effects of PERFORMANCE and RELIABILITY on the 
likelihood of deviation from perfect mirroring, I took the coefficients obtained from 
Model 4 and plotted the predicted probabilities of deviation against the two independent 
variables, with all other variables evaluated at their mean values. Figure 4.1 indicates that 
both PERFORMANCE and RELIABILITY have a positive impact on a systems 
integration firm’s probability to deviate from perfect mirroring. Moreover, 
RELIABILITY appears to have a stronger marginal effect on probability to deviate for 
most of the range in the dataset.    
Robustness checks. To assess the robustness of the results, I ran additional 
models with interactions between variables. Because customers with high performance or 
high reliability demands are underserved by the mainstream market, these customers 
would be willing to pay a price premium to obtain the high performance or high 
reliability systems they need (Christensen et al., 2002). This price premium reduces the 
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production volume needed to justify the fixed costs associated with internal component 
development. In other words, the positive effects of customer’s performance and 
reliability demands on the likelihood of deviation should be larger for firms with higher 
production volume.   
According to Hoetker (2007), the marginal effect of an interaction between two 
variables in a logit model is not simply the coefficient for their interaction. Due to the 
nonlinear nature of logit models, the magnitude and even the sign of the marginal effect 
can differ across observations (Huang and Shields, 2000). Thus, interpretation of 
interactions is more complicated in logit models. To make it easier to assess interactions, 
I transformed the continuous variable PRODUCTION VOLUME into a categorical 
variable by median splitting into low and high categories. Model 5 replaces the 
continuous variable PRODUCTION VOLUME in Model 4 with the categorical 
VOLUME DUMMY variable. Results from Model 5 are consistent with results from 
Model 4, both in terms of coefficient estimates and goodness-of-fit measures, suggesting 
that the categorical variable can be an acceptable substitute for the continuous variable. 
This model specification produces the following multivariate statistical model:  
DEVIATION =  
β0 + β1-2 Controls + β3 VOLUME DUMMY +  
β4 PERFORMANCE + β5 RELIABILITY +  
β6 VOLUME_DUMMY × PERFORMANCE +  
β7 VOLUME_DUMMY × RELIABILITY + ε 
 
Table 4.4 summarizes the coefficient estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for 
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the 3 logit models used to assess interaction between production volume and the two 
independent variables. Model 6 includes only the independent variable PERFORMANCE 
and the interaction term. Consistent with Model 4, coefficient for PERFORMANCE is 
statistically significant and positive. However the interaction term is not statistically 
significant in this model. Model 7 includes only the independent variable 
PERFORMANCE and the interaction term. Consistent with Model 4, coefficient for 
RELIABILITY is statistically significant and positive. However the interaction term is 
also not statistically significant in this model. Model 8 is the full model with both 
independent variables and interaction terms included. Coefficients for RELIABILITY 
and the interaction term between RELIABILITY and VOLUME DUMMY are 
statistically significant. Coefficients for PERFORMANCE and the interaction term 
between PERFORMANCE and VOLUME DUMMY are not statistically significant.  
Interpretation is further complicated by the fact that the significance of the 
interaction effect in logit models cannot be determined by just the significance of the 
interaction coefficient (Hoetker, 2007). To help interpret the results obtained, I followed 
Hoetker’s (2007) recommendation to produce graphical presentation in order to provide 
the most complete understanding of the interaction’s effect. In addition, I also followed 
Zelner’s (2009) recommended simulation-based approach, as implemented in STATA’s 
marginsplot command, to produce the 95% confidence interval in Figure 4.2(a.) and 
4.2(b.) to help interpret the interaction.  
Even though the coefficient for the interaction term between RELIABILITY and 
VOLUME DUMMY is statistically significant, Figure 4.2(b.) shows the 95% confidence 
intervals are clearly separated only between the RELIABILITY = 5.5 and RELIABILITY 
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= 8.5. This pattern indicates that statistically, the interaction effect is significant only in a 
specific range. These results suggest only reliability demand reduces the production 
volume needed to justify the fixed costs associated with internal component development, 
and only over a specific range.  
In addition, I ran additional models to assess the interaction between the 
independent variables with the control variable COMPONENT BUSINESS. Participation 
in the component business indicates possession of component development capability, 
which might interact with the two independent variables in their impact on probability to 
deviate from perfect mirroring. Firms participating in the component business should be 
more likely to deviate from using COTS components from the market given the same 
level of performance and reliability demand. This model specification produces the 
following multivariate statistical model:  
DEVIATION =  
β0 + β1-3 Controls + β4 PERFORMANCE + β5 RELIABILITY +  
β6 COMPONENT BUSINESS × PERFORMANCE +  
β7 COMPONENT BUSINESS × RELIABILITY + ε 
Table 4.5 summarizes the coefficient estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for 
the 3 logit models used to assess interaction between participation in component business 
and the two independent variables. Similar to the interaction with production volume, the 
results only indicate interaction between RELIABILITY and COMPONENT 
BUSINESS. However, contrary to expectation, the sign of the interaction terms between 
RELIABILITY and COMPONENT BUSINESS is consistently negative.  
In summary, the empirical results strongly support the two hypotheses. Increase in 
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production volume increases the likelihood of using custom designed components instead 
of readily available COTS components. Increase in target customers’ performance and 
reliability demand reduces the extent of mirroring for systems integration firms. As 
expected, target customers’ reliability demand interact with production volume, while 
target customers’ performance demand does not appear to interact with production 
volume.  
 
4.6 Discussion 
Within the mainstream modularity literature, product modularity is said to be 
associated with loosely coupled organizations that use market-based coordination 
mechanisms to coordinate their product development activities (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). This study explains why firms adopting 
standardized modular product architecture sometimes deviate from this prediction. I 
proposed and found strong empirical support that systems integration firms would refrain 
from perfect mirroring if they target customers with high performance or high reliability 
demands, because these firms are more reliant on system fine-tuning to achieve the 
desired product qualities. The computer industry has become the paradigmatic example 
of the mirroring hypothesis (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Langlois, 1992; Langlois and 
Robertson, 1992). Finding clear evidence of demand contingencies in this paradigmatic 
context provides strong support for the contingent nature of the mirroring hypothesis.  
Furthermore, the empirical results also indicate that target customers' reliability 
demand has a greater and more consistent impact on the mirroring relationship than target 
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customers' performance demand. Thus, different demand-side factors impact the 
mirroring relationship in different ways, suggesting the need for more careful theoretical 
and empirical investigation to untangle the different mechanisms. Theoretically, the 
extant literature has suggested two alternative ways of improving product system 
performance: 1.) modular innovation accessible through the component market; 2.) 
architectural innovation as the result of standard disruption. My discussion earlier 
suggests a third alternative: namely, through careful fine-tuning or “tweaking” the 
system. The equifinality in performance improvement mechanisms suggests that systems 
integrators would select the least costly approach. Empirically, knowledge about this 
industry provides the cost explanations to the observed differential impacts of 
performance and reliability demands. Specifically, the underpinning semiconductor 
technology has achieved a persistent doubling of performance approximately every two 
years, an observation known as the Moore’s Law (Moore, 1965). This trajectory 
translates to million-fold cost reductions and performance improvements in one of the 
performance critical components of a computer system. The unique exponential 
performance growth and cost reduction diminish the cost-effectiveness of system fine-
tuning as a way to attain marginal performance gain, which helps explain the weaker 
impact of performance demand on mirroring in this context.  
System reliability, on the other hand, does not automatically improve as the 
underpinning component technologies improve. In addition, system reliability is also 
relative to the unique use case the integrated product system is intended for. Thus, unlike 
performance, reliability is more specific to the particular target customers' needs, since 
each unique use case can potentially introduce product deployment conditions that had 
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not been considered when the component standard was defined. Systems integrators 
pursuing high reliability thus have to resort to tighter organizational integration to 
discover and contain incidental component interactions that cause reliability issues.  
The differential impacts of performance and reliability on mirroring also reveals 
that there are in fact two different kinds of system fine-tuning. Fine-tuning for better 
system performance is more often guided by existing knowledge of component 
interactions, i.e., fine-tuning for better performance is enabled by extant architectural 
knowledge. The improved system performance is the intended consequence of the fine-
tuning efforts. On the other hand, fine-tuning for better reliability proceeds as an 
experiment to uncover unintended and therefore unknown component interactions, i.e., 
fine-tuning for better reliability is in essence an organized search effort for new 
architectural knowledge, which requires a more integrated organizational structure. Fine-
tuning for reliability therefore has a greater impact on mirroring between product and 
organization. 
4.7 Limitations 
 This study has several limitations. First, reliance on subjective expert coding can 
potentially introduce measurement issues for the key variables. Even though the coding 
procedure produced acceptable intercoder reliability, reliability does not guarantee 
construct validity. The dichotomous coding for the dependent variable also reduces the 
observed variation in the statistical analysis. Since deviation from perfect mirroring was 
observed across the three-layer stack (i.e., hardware, system software, and application 
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software), multinomial logit model could have been employed to exploit the observed 
variation more. However, the limited sample size prevented such an approach.  
 Second, there are reasons to believe that the constructed sample does not cover all 
industries that adopt Intel x86 architecture. Anecdotal evidence indicates widespread 
adoption of this technology in the medical device and defense industries. However, these 
industries were not well represented in the sample, because firms in these industries are 
reluctant to disclose their product details due to security or liability concerns. Therefore, 
the constructed sample might be biased, although interviewees at the three systems 
integrators did provide similar accounts for their engagements in these industries.   
 Finally, there are alternative explanations besides system fine-tuning that cannot 
be fully ruled out due to the limitations of the empirical design. Specifically, differential 
capabilities in component technologies might better explain firms’ vertical boundary 
choices (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). Even though I included the variable COMPONENT 
BUSINESS to control for this alternative explanation, the control variable is not 
statistically significant as expected, suggesting that systems integrators’ participation in 
component business is perhaps not a god measurement for component capabilities in this 
empirical context. A related alternative explanation reinforces this concern. Perhaps a 
systems integrator forgoes using readily available COTS component because it possesses 
unique, superior component development capabilities. This firm might be able to extract 
monopoly rent if it chooses to always bundle the component with the rest of the system. 
In this case, lack of participation in component business is in fact the result of superior 
capabilities.  
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 Interviews with industry practitioners suggest an additional alternative 
interpretations of my empirical results on reliability. Customers intending to deploy in 
mission-critical application sometimes demand component service and replacement 
availability far exceeding the typical time period provided by COTS component vendors. 
These customers are unwilling to take on the uncertainty of discontinued component 
service or replacement availability because once they certify the system for their mission-
critical applications, they would prefer not to change any detail of their deployment. 
Thus, even without the need to fine-tune for better reliability, systems integrators might 
still internalize the component development tasks in order to satisfy the extended service 
and availability expectations. However, these customers also typically demand high 
reliability in their systems. My current empirical design is therefore unable to tease apart 
the two mechanisms.          
4.8 Conclusion     
This study contributes to the modularity literature in several ways. First, this study 
puts forth a contingent model and provides empirical evidence that help reconcile the 
mainstream narratives of mirroring and the emerging revisionist perspective that 
challenges the mainstream predictions. As discussed earlier, there is an inherent tension 
in modular design as systems integration firms try to improve overall product 
performance. These firms can rely on modular innovations in performance-critical 
components to deliver better overall performance, while preserving the benefits of having 
established interface standards. However, this approach places an upper limit on 
performance that is inherent in the current architecture. In addition, this approach also 
means the system integrators are dependent on external component suppliers to improve 
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performance-critical components. Alternatively, these firms can choose to disrupt 
established interface standards with architectural innovations, which can potentially 
provide significantly better performance but at a much higher cost and risk of failure.  
I suggest that there is a third commonly used approach of system fine-tuning, 
which combines the advantages of the first two approaches. The reliance on system fine-
tuning as a mechanism to optimize performance within current product architecture 
provides the demand-side contingencies that reconcile the long-standing debate. Firms 
that rely more on system fine-tuning are expected to have reduced mirroring between 
product and organization. 
Second, the discussion on system fine-tuning also leads to a counter-intuitive 
conclusion that challenges an implicit assumption of symmetry in the extant literature. 
Because the architectural knowledge on component interactions can never be complete, 
product modularity as experienced during system decomposition and product modularity 
as experienced during system integration are not perfectly symmetrical. There will 
always be some unforeseen integration issues, in spite of ex ante standardization of 
component interface (Cabigiosu et al., 2013; Chuma, 2006; Kotabe et al., 2007; Ro et al., 
2008; Sosa et al., 2004; Staudenmayer et al., 2005; Takeishi, 2002; Tidd, 1995).  
This asymmetry not only provides a way to reconcile the debate on mirroring, it 
also points to the need to further refine our conceptualization of modularity. Along 
similar line of logic, Andriani and Carignani (2014) puts forth the concept of modular 
exaptation, which is the cooption of existing component technologies to serve system 
functions not originally designed for the components. In this case, system integration is 
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likely to encounter much more incidental interactions not accounted for in the existing 
component interface. Fixson and Park (2008) suggest that the set of modular design 
operators put forth by Baldwin and Clark (2000) is incomplete. Future theory 
development on modular design should address this potential asymmetry of 
decomposition and integration. 
Third, this study provides an empirical analysis on how demand heterogeneity 
contributes to firm heterogeneity. Consistent with Priem and coauthors’ (2012) 
observation, researchers have not given sufficient attention to demand-side issues. This 
study is the first to my knowledge that looks into how target customers’ demands impact 
the mirroring relationship between product and organization. Future research can further 
explore how different demand factors impact the mirroring relationships differently, 
shedding more light on how managers manage the interactions between the technologies 
under development and the organizations that develop these technologies.
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
COMPONENT 0.506 0.682** 0.223 0.530 
BUSINESS (1.20) (2.82) (0.18) (0.39) 
     MILITARY 1.125 1.249* -0.976 -0.453 
 (1.32) (2.24) (-1.07) (-0.51) 
     PRODUCTION  0.872*** 0.640*** 0.517*** 0.517*** 
VOLUME (5.84) (6.50) (4.35) (3.47) 
     PERFORMANCE  0.558
**  0.358
** 
  (3.69)  (2.84) 
     RELIABILITY   0.732
*** 0.639*** 
   (11.50) (6.50) 
     Constant -2.710*** -4.170*** -4.889*** -6.079*** 
  (-10.26) (-7.43) (-6.04) (-5.96) 
Observations 177 177 177 177 
Adjusted Count R2 0.477 0.628 0.663 0.686 
McFadden's R2 0.279 0.415 0.529 0.568 
Log-likelihood -88.466 -71.745 -57.738 -53.008 
t statistics in parentheses 
   * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
     Table 4.3 Results of logistic regression analyses for deviation from perfect 
modularity 
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    Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
COMPONENT 0.530 1.873* 1.193*** 1.628* 1.961* 
BUSINESS (0.39) (2.17) (3.31) (2.55) (2.42) 
      MILITARY -0.453 -0.471 1.188* -1.008 -0.469 
 (-0.51) (-0.73) (2.01) (-1.44) (-0.65) 
      PRODUCTION  0.517***     VOLUME (3.47)     
      VOLUME  1.218
*** 3.074** 0.645 0.733 
DUMMY  (3.62) (2.68) (1.23) (0.53) 
   
  
  PERFORMANCE 0.358** 0.320* 0.696**  0.476 
 (2.84) (2.45) (2.78)  (1.58) 
       RELIABILITY 0.639*** 0.619***   0.635*** 0.439*** 
 (6.50) (8.45)   (5.54) (4.04) 
      VOLUME DUMMY *   -0.338  -0.240 PERFORMANCE   (-1.40)  (-0.70) 
      VOLUME DUMMY *    0.171 0.317
** 
RELIABILITY    (1.55) (2.63) 
      
       (-5.96) (-7.70) (-4.81) (-8.31) (-4.17) 
Observations 177 177 177 177 177 
Adjusted Count R2 0.686 0.698 0.651 0.651 0.733 
McFadden's R2 0.568 0.544 0.410 0.516 0.554 
Log-likelihood -53.008 -55.865 -72.401 -59.342 -54.656 
t statistics in 
parentheses 
     * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
    
      Table 4.4 Results of logistic regression analyses for deviation from perfect modularity 
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                 Figure 4.2 (a.) 
 
 
 
 
                   
                 Figure 4.2 (b.) 
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   Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
 COMPONENT 1.518 3.463** 4.835* 
 BUSINESS (1.80) (2.53) (2.38) 
      MILITARY 1.252* -1.387 -0.827 
  (2.29) (-1.33) (-0.88)       PRODUCTION  0.638*** 0.479*** 0.446***  VOLUME (6.45) (6.08) (4.77)  
     PERFORMANCE 0.578***   0.434** 
  (4.11)   (3.06)        RELIABILITY   0.885*** 0.835*** 
    (7.00) (4.46)       COMPONENT BUSINESS * -0.242  -0.170  PERFORMANCE (-1.55)  (-0.93)       COMPONENT BUSINESS *  -0.664
** -0.726** 
 RELIABILITY  (-2.63) (-2.68)       Constant -4.237*** -5.477*** -7.203*** 
   (-8.03) (-5.66) (-4.59) 
 Observations 177 177 177 
 Adjusted Count R2 0.640 0.698 0.721 
 McFadden's R2 0.416 0.553 0.598 
 Log-likelihood -71.556 -54.864 -49.271 
 t statistics in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
   
     Table 4.5 Results of logistic regression analyses for deviation from perfect 
modularity 
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